The Times - Saturday, 27th February 2010
We often use the saying that there is no gain without pain, a very useful principle in life, which we discover for ourselves from personal experience and pass on to our children. Economics and, especially, economic policy is replete with examples as well. Businesses have to shave off their prices to sell more products. Industrial sectors have to undertake unpalatable and unpopular restructuring, costing thousands of euros to remain competitive. During a slowdown, firms have to release long-time workers or use wage restraint to survive. Whole economies go through severe austerity programmes in order to become leaner and meaner in a highly-globalised world. For many disciplined countries, like certain self-disciplined persons, this comes naturally and as a matter of fact. Some observers tend to associate such people with a particular religion such as those who abide by the protestant ethic. Others stereotype the Germans or the Chinese as being sterner and less indulgent than, say, the Latino or Mediterranean people. For the latter group, which include the Maltese, we tend to hold the view that discipline has to come from above to have any effect at all: parents, Church authorities, governmental authorities. However, wherever it comes from, within or outside, pain is perceived as a precursor of long-term gain. In the macro economic sphere, especially regarding public finances, the pain economists require to deliver economic stability refers specifically to the need to ensure that political promises can be kept without causing long-term damage and to avoid wasteful expenditure. Essentially, they are the principles of living within one's means: very simple principles but very hard to maintain. Even governments that are self-restrained enough to avoid extravagance find the pressures of the welfare state hard to control. We can say that health, education and social security, including pensions, can become the three nightmares of every Administration. One has to keep an eye on the budgets available, the demographics, the cost of supplying these services and the politics. Self-disciplined governments often find the need to redesign these programmes to make them sustainable. This exercise we refer to as reform or restructuring. Malta today is passing through a very difficult and painful episode of its post-war economic history. No matter how you measure and label this general malaise, calling it absolute poverty, relative poverty or near poverty, the state of affairs is pretty much the same. Many Maltese middle-class families once again fear sliding into the hole most had managed to come out of and would have never dreamt of sliding into again. The Maltese business class has nearly given up all hope of ever winning the losing battle with rising costs and falling revenues, which it has been fighting all throughout this decade. Now many of its members, especially the small ones, are finally deciding to hang up their boots and rush into an early retirement. But all this pain is not the result of structural reform that will reap long-term economic benefits. It has been caused by a decade of economic stagnation; by two prolonged recessions in the space of a decade, by an ever-increasing national tax burden and by a lack of attention to good economic and fiscal management and regulation, especially in the area of utility pricing. Not all pain begets gain. There is so much pain in the world that begets only more pain and suffering. Some of it might have been self-inflicted through past foolish decisions or misjudgments. It is quite dishonest to point to all the economic and social pain suffered to date by the Maltese and say that it has been necessary for our economic well-being. If the government, the Central Bank or the European Commission can convince us that, during these last 12 years, Malta's price competitiveness has improved, that its public expenditures have been kept in check, that Maltese taxpayers are getting more value for money from their taxes and that the health, education, social security and pension programmes are now on a sustainable path, then we can truly state that our pain has been real worth suffering. If not, then the government should grimly admit that it has all been pain without gain.
Prof. Scicluna is a Labour member of the European Parliament.
27.2.10
L-Unjoni Ewropea u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem: Każ tal-“karrotta” u l-“għasluġ”
www.l-orizzont.com - Il-Ħamis 18 ta' Frar 2010
Il-Parlament Ewropew qatt ma evita li jiddibatti dwar drittijiet umani jew żamm “fommu sieket” għax beża’, jew jibża’, li jista’ jweġġa lil xi ħadd. Id-difiża tad-drittijiet umani hi l-bażi fl-Unjoni Ewropea, maħluqa bi tweġiba għat-Tieni Gwerra Dinjija – biex ikun assigurat li l-popli Ewropej jirrisolvu d-differenzi politiċi tagħhom b’dis kussjonijiet f’kull livell u mhux billi joqtlu lil xulxin fi gwerer. Illum, sittin sena mit-Tieni Gwerra Dinjija, ir-ratifikar tat-Trattat ta’ Lisbona jfisser li l-liġijiet kollha Ewropej iridu jkunu konsistenti mal-libertajiet politici, demokratici u soċjali kif elenkati fiċ-Charter tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Bniedem. Aktar minn hekk, meta l-Parlament Ewropew jieħu pożizzjoni dwar is-sitwaz zjoni tad-drittijiet politiċi u umani f’xi pajjiż mhux membru tal-UE, il-pajjiż inkwistjoni jagħti widen. Il-Kumitat tal-Affarijiet Barranin tal-Parlament Ew ropew mhux kumitat leġislattiv, imma hu meqjus mill-gruppi politiċi kollha bħala ta’ importanza kbira, bir-riżultat li l-pożizzjoni li jieħu l-Parlament Ewropew tkun dikjarazzjoni ta’ pożizzjoni qawwija. Mezz ieħor li bih jaħdem il-Parlament Ewropew fi kwis tjonijiet ta’ drittijiet umani hu permezz ta’ delegazzjonijiet parlamentari. Hemm aktar minn 30 delegazzjoni li jservu ta’ ħolqa bejn il-Parlament Ewropew u l-pajjiżi mferrxin mad-dinja kollha, li jvarjaw minn Assemblej Parlamentari Konġunti bħal m’huma l-ACP, EUROMED u EUROLAT għal Kumitati Parlamentari Konġunti mwaqqfin b’riżultati ta’ ftehim ta’ assoċjazzjoni għal tkattir ta’ koperazzjoni. Hemm imbagħad ir-rwol ta’ osservaturi, speċjalment waqt l-elezzjonijiet f’xi wħud minn dawn il-pajjiżi. Dawn id-delegazzjonijiet jsegwu mill-qrib ħafna d-drittijiet umani. Fl-1991, delegazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew kienet l-ewwel waħda tax-xorta tagħha li qatt ingħatat il-permess li żżur it-Tibet. Hemmhekk tqajmu mistoqsijiet dwar ksur ta’ drittijiet umani. Każ simili kien dak li seħħ f’nofs is-Snin Disgħin, meta d-delegazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew għar-Relazzjonijiet mar-Repubbliki taċ-Ċentru tal-Asja ħadmet bis-sħiħ u għamlet kampanja qawwija biex il-Parlament Ewropew itawwal l-approvazzjoni għal ftehim ta’ ‘partnership’ u koperazzjoni mal-Kazakhistan u Uzbekistan, kampanja li wasslet biex inkisbu konċessjonijiet qabel mal-Parlament fl-1999 laqa’ ż-żewġ talbiet imsemmijin. Sadattant, l-Assemblea Parlamentari Konġunta ACP-EU, li tagħha jien membru, fl-2002 kienet ħassret il-ħames sessjoni tagħha kawża tal-fatt li fid-delegazzjoni ta’ Zimbabwe fl-ACP kien se jkun hemm żewġ Ministri li kienu miżmumin mill-Unjoni Ewropea milli jivvjaġġaw. L-Unjoni Ewropea kif tista’ tassigura b’mod effettiv li ‘l barra mill-fruntieri tagħha jkunu rispettati d-drittijiet umani? Hu ovvju, li l-“karrotta” ewlenija tal-Unjoni Ewropea hi l-prospett ta’ ftehim bilaterali għal kummerċ ħieles mal-akbar suq fid-dinja. Imma, fl-istess ħin, il-“karrotta” riflessa fis-suq tal-Unjoni Ewropea sservi wkoll ta’ “għasluġ” biex jistimula riforma. Id-djalogu flimkien mal-“karrota u l-għasluġ” ekonomiku hu l-mod li ħadem bih s’issa l-Parlament Ewropew biex jikseb riżultat. L-akbar każ tal-“karrotta u l-għasluġ” huwa dak li jirrelata għad-dibatittu li għadu għaddej dwar Ftehim ta’ Assoċjazzjoni bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u Iżrael. Bħal fil-każ ta’ Malta, l-Unjoni Ewropea hi l-akbar importatur ta’ prodotti minn Iżrael, u t-tieni l-akbar esportatur lejn Iżrael. Fis-sena 2006 in-negozju bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u Iżrael kien jammonta għal 23.5 biljun Ewro. Għal dawn l-aħħar snin l-Unjoni Ewropea rreżistiet talbiet minn Iżrael biex jogħla l-livell ta’ relazzjonijiet bejniethom, bl-Unjoni Ewropea titlob li qabel isir dan irid ikun hemm progress min-naħa ta’ Iżrael fejn jikkonċerna l-konflitt Iżraeli-Palestinjan. Riċentement fil-Parlament Ewropew kienu dibatituti r-relazzjonijiet bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u t-Tunezija, dibattitu profond, imma wkoll riskjuż, li jista’ jkollu konsegwenzi fir-relazzjonijiet bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u t-Tuneżija. Kif irrimarkajt fis-sessjoni plenarja tal-Parlament Ewropew, id-dibattitu sar barra minn ħinu – fl-istess ħin li Parlamentari Tuneżini kienu qegħdin iżuru l-Parlament Ewropew, li bla dubju ħassewhom imbarazzati – b’uħud mill-kelliema jikkundannaw lill-Gvern Tunezin dwar kwistjonijiet li għandu mas-soċjetà ċivili. L-Unjoni Ewropea hi l-akbar sieħeb kummerċjali li għandha t-Tuneżija, konsistenti f’madwar 70% tal-importazzjoni Tuneżina (€9.5 biljun) u 75% tal-esportazzjoni Tuneżina (€9.9 biljun), żewġ ċifri li t-tnejn żdiedu b’mod sinifikattiv fis-snin li għaddew. Prova li t-Tunezija hi sieħeb mal-Unjoni Ewropea, toħroġ mill-fatt li meta fis-sena 2008 tneħħew it-tariffi fuq prodotti industrijali, it-Tuneżija kienet ukoll l-ewwel pajjiż Mediterranju li daħal fi ftehim ta’ kummerċ ħieles mal-Unjoni Ewropea. Waqt li kien għaddej dan kollu, riċentement kien hemm ħafna aktar sinjali ta’ titjib fid-djalogu bejn it-Tuneżija u l-Unjoni Ewropea kemm fuq livell ta’ Kummissjoni kif ukoll ta Parlament. Id-djalogu mal-Kummissjoni kien jinkludi l-ipprogrammar ta’ ħafna laqgħat ta’ sotto-kumitati fil-qafas tal-Ftehim ta’ Assoċjazzjoni Tuneżija-Unjoni Ewropea (nkluż s-Sotto Kumitat dwar id-Drittijiet Umani u d-Demokrazija) filwaqt li d-djalogu fuq livell ta’ Parlament Ewropew kien rifless fiż-żjara riċenti fi Brussels ta’ delegazzjoni importanti ta’ Parlamentari Tuneżini li kienet magħmula minn rappre żentanti tal-erba’ partiti politiċi rappreżentati fil-Kamra tad-Deputati Tuneżna, kif ukoll bil-laqgħa Interparlamentari Tuneżija–Unjoni Ewropea li għandha ssir f’Marzu li ġej fi Brussels. Ma jagħmel ebda sens li tkun kritikata u iżolata t-Tuneżija meta hu evidenti li sar progress f’ħafna sferi f’dan il-pajjiż. Li tikkawża imbarazzament politiku bla qliegħ tanġibbli jista’ jagħti lil xi Parlamentari Ewropej xi sens ta’ superjorità morali, imma tagħmel ftit ferm biex ittejjeb l-istatus tal-poplu Tuneżin. Ejjew nassiguraw li t-Tuneżija u pajjiżi oħrajn mhux membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea jikkonformu mal-livelli Ewopej fl-oqsma ekonomiċi, soċjali, politiċi u ta’ drittijiet umani. U ejjew nużaw il-mod tal-“karrotta” u l-“għasluġ” biex nassiguraw li t-transizzjoni lejn demokrazija funzjonabbli b’aktar minn partit wieħed tkun ġenwina. Imma ejjew nagħmlu dan bi djalogu ppjanat tajjeb u strutturat. L-ingranagg tar-riforma qiegħed jaħdem. Ejjew inħalluh jaħdem mingħajr tfixkil bla bżonn.
Il-Parlament Ewropew qatt ma evita li jiddibatti dwar drittijiet umani jew żamm “fommu sieket” għax beża’, jew jibża’, li jista’ jweġġa lil xi ħadd. Id-difiża tad-drittijiet umani hi l-bażi fl-Unjoni Ewropea, maħluqa bi tweġiba għat-Tieni Gwerra Dinjija – biex ikun assigurat li l-popli Ewropej jirrisolvu d-differenzi politiċi tagħhom b’dis kussjonijiet f’kull livell u mhux billi joqtlu lil xulxin fi gwerer. Illum, sittin sena mit-Tieni Gwerra Dinjija, ir-ratifikar tat-Trattat ta’ Lisbona jfisser li l-liġijiet kollha Ewropej iridu jkunu konsistenti mal-libertajiet politici, demokratici u soċjali kif elenkati fiċ-Charter tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Bniedem. Aktar minn hekk, meta l-Parlament Ewropew jieħu pożizzjoni dwar is-sitwaz zjoni tad-drittijiet politiċi u umani f’xi pajjiż mhux membru tal-UE, il-pajjiż inkwistjoni jagħti widen. Il-Kumitat tal-Affarijiet Barranin tal-Parlament Ew ropew mhux kumitat leġislattiv, imma hu meqjus mill-gruppi politiċi kollha bħala ta’ importanza kbira, bir-riżultat li l-pożizzjoni li jieħu l-Parlament Ewropew tkun dikjarazzjoni ta’ pożizzjoni qawwija. Mezz ieħor li bih jaħdem il-Parlament Ewropew fi kwis tjonijiet ta’ drittijiet umani hu permezz ta’ delegazzjonijiet parlamentari. Hemm aktar minn 30 delegazzjoni li jservu ta’ ħolqa bejn il-Parlament Ewropew u l-pajjiżi mferrxin mad-dinja kollha, li jvarjaw minn Assemblej Parlamentari Konġunti bħal m’huma l-ACP, EUROMED u EUROLAT għal Kumitati Parlamentari Konġunti mwaqqfin b’riżultati ta’ ftehim ta’ assoċjazzjoni għal tkattir ta’ koperazzjoni. Hemm imbagħad ir-rwol ta’ osservaturi, speċjalment waqt l-elezzjonijiet f’xi wħud minn dawn il-pajjiżi. Dawn id-delegazzjonijiet jsegwu mill-qrib ħafna d-drittijiet umani. Fl-1991, delegazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew kienet l-ewwel waħda tax-xorta tagħha li qatt ingħatat il-permess li żżur it-Tibet. Hemmhekk tqajmu mistoqsijiet dwar ksur ta’ drittijiet umani. Każ simili kien dak li seħħ f’nofs is-Snin Disgħin, meta d-delegazzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew għar-Relazzjonijiet mar-Repubbliki taċ-Ċentru tal-Asja ħadmet bis-sħiħ u għamlet kampanja qawwija biex il-Parlament Ewropew itawwal l-approvazzjoni għal ftehim ta’ ‘partnership’ u koperazzjoni mal-Kazakhistan u Uzbekistan, kampanja li wasslet biex inkisbu konċessjonijiet qabel mal-Parlament fl-1999 laqa’ ż-żewġ talbiet imsemmijin. Sadattant, l-Assemblea Parlamentari Konġunta ACP-EU, li tagħha jien membru, fl-2002 kienet ħassret il-ħames sessjoni tagħha kawża tal-fatt li fid-delegazzjoni ta’ Zimbabwe fl-ACP kien se jkun hemm żewġ Ministri li kienu miżmumin mill-Unjoni Ewropea milli jivvjaġġaw. L-Unjoni Ewropea kif tista’ tassigura b’mod effettiv li ‘l barra mill-fruntieri tagħha jkunu rispettati d-drittijiet umani? Hu ovvju, li l-“karrotta” ewlenija tal-Unjoni Ewropea hi l-prospett ta’ ftehim bilaterali għal kummerċ ħieles mal-akbar suq fid-dinja. Imma, fl-istess ħin, il-“karrotta” riflessa fis-suq tal-Unjoni Ewropea sservi wkoll ta’ “għasluġ” biex jistimula riforma. Id-djalogu flimkien mal-“karrota u l-għasluġ” ekonomiku hu l-mod li ħadem bih s’issa l-Parlament Ewropew biex jikseb riżultat. L-akbar każ tal-“karrotta u l-għasluġ” huwa dak li jirrelata għad-dibatittu li għadu għaddej dwar Ftehim ta’ Assoċjazzjoni bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u Iżrael. Bħal fil-każ ta’ Malta, l-Unjoni Ewropea hi l-akbar importatur ta’ prodotti minn Iżrael, u t-tieni l-akbar esportatur lejn Iżrael. Fis-sena 2006 in-negozju bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u Iżrael kien jammonta għal 23.5 biljun Ewro. Għal dawn l-aħħar snin l-Unjoni Ewropea rreżistiet talbiet minn Iżrael biex jogħla l-livell ta’ relazzjonijiet bejniethom, bl-Unjoni Ewropea titlob li qabel isir dan irid ikun hemm progress min-naħa ta’ Iżrael fejn jikkonċerna l-konflitt Iżraeli-Palestinjan. Riċentement fil-Parlament Ewropew kienu dibatituti r-relazzjonijiet bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u t-Tunezija, dibattitu profond, imma wkoll riskjuż, li jista’ jkollu konsegwenzi fir-relazzjonijiet bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u t-Tuneżija. Kif irrimarkajt fis-sessjoni plenarja tal-Parlament Ewropew, id-dibattitu sar barra minn ħinu – fl-istess ħin li Parlamentari Tuneżini kienu qegħdin iżuru l-Parlament Ewropew, li bla dubju ħassewhom imbarazzati – b’uħud mill-kelliema jikkundannaw lill-Gvern Tunezin dwar kwistjonijiet li għandu mas-soċjetà ċivili. L-Unjoni Ewropea hi l-akbar sieħeb kummerċjali li għandha t-Tuneżija, konsistenti f’madwar 70% tal-importazzjoni Tuneżina (€9.5 biljun) u 75% tal-esportazzjoni Tuneżina (€9.9 biljun), żewġ ċifri li t-tnejn żdiedu b’mod sinifikattiv fis-snin li għaddew. Prova li t-Tunezija hi sieħeb mal-Unjoni Ewropea, toħroġ mill-fatt li meta fis-sena 2008 tneħħew it-tariffi fuq prodotti industrijali, it-Tuneżija kienet ukoll l-ewwel pajjiż Mediterranju li daħal fi ftehim ta’ kummerċ ħieles mal-Unjoni Ewropea. Waqt li kien għaddej dan kollu, riċentement kien hemm ħafna aktar sinjali ta’ titjib fid-djalogu bejn it-Tuneżija u l-Unjoni Ewropea kemm fuq livell ta’ Kummissjoni kif ukoll ta Parlament. Id-djalogu mal-Kummissjoni kien jinkludi l-ipprogrammar ta’ ħafna laqgħat ta’ sotto-kumitati fil-qafas tal-Ftehim ta’ Assoċjazzjoni Tuneżija-Unjoni Ewropea (nkluż s-Sotto Kumitat dwar id-Drittijiet Umani u d-Demokrazija) filwaqt li d-djalogu fuq livell ta’ Parlament Ewropew kien rifless fiż-żjara riċenti fi Brussels ta’ delegazzjoni importanti ta’ Parlamentari Tuneżini li kienet magħmula minn rappre żentanti tal-erba’ partiti politiċi rappreżentati fil-Kamra tad-Deputati Tuneżna, kif ukoll bil-laqgħa Interparlamentari Tuneżija–Unjoni Ewropea li għandha ssir f’Marzu li ġej fi Brussels. Ma jagħmel ebda sens li tkun kritikata u iżolata t-Tuneżija meta hu evidenti li sar progress f’ħafna sferi f’dan il-pajjiż. Li tikkawża imbarazzament politiku bla qliegħ tanġibbli jista’ jagħti lil xi Parlamentari Ewropej xi sens ta’ superjorità morali, imma tagħmel ftit ferm biex ittejjeb l-istatus tal-poplu Tuneżin. Ejjew nassiguraw li t-Tuneżija u pajjiżi oħrajn mhux membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea jikkonformu mal-livelli Ewopej fl-oqsma ekonomiċi, soċjali, politiċi u ta’ drittijiet umani. U ejjew nużaw il-mod tal-“karrotta” u l-“għasluġ” biex nassiguraw li t-transizzjoni lejn demokrazija funzjonabbli b’aktar minn partit wieħed tkun ġenwina. Imma ejjew nagħmlu dan bi djalogu ppjanat tajjeb u strutturat. L-ingranagg tar-riforma qiegħed jaħdem. Ejjew inħalluh jaħdem mingħajr tfixkil bla bżonn.
Europe’s response to the financial crisis – some success, but much more to do
The Malta Independent - Saturday, 13th February 2010
My first Rapporteurship as an MEP drew closer to success this week following the committee vote on my report on the performance of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2008 and 2009, as the ECB, EU and Member States battled to limit the damage caused by the financial crisis. The result, with the draft report approved by 35 votes and just 2 against, demonstrates, I hope, that a good balance was found. Of course, while the political negotiations in the Economic and Monetary Affairs committee have been concluded, they will resume again in February when my report is debated with President Trichet and then voted in Parliament. The work is far from over. I have found the experience as a Rapporteur to be a complex and multi-faceted role. Writing the report is the easy bit! The real challenge is the lengthy negotiation with colleagues from the other political groups, with President Trichet and other high-ranking ECB officials, and with fellow colleagues in my Socialist and Democrat party group, all of whom have political ‘red-lines’ and their own ideas. Reconciling these competing positions while still retaining the integrity and coherence of the text is a fine balancing act. The report itself, needless to say, focuses on the crisis that has engulfed European countries over the past two years. The financial and economic crisis has seen the worst global economic decline since the 1930s and the most rigorous test of the ECB since its inception. After a relatively benign period of economic growth enjoyed across most of Europe for over a decade most Member States have had their economy ‘stress-tested’, not through a simulated model but in real time and with painfully real consequences. In 2008, GDP growth across the euro area was just 0.7% and, by the time my report is voted in plenary, we will have the frightening statistics of a significant economic contraction together with a forecast of a very sluggish return to growth in 2010 and 2011. Most Member States are experiencing rising budgetary deficits and soaring government debt. The Commission’s economic forecasts in May 2009 predicted average budget deficits across the eurozone of 5.3% and average government debt of 77.7%, figures which, in turn, are both expected to increase in 2010. It may take many years for these deficits, brought about by the financial crisis, to return to the levels of 2006 and 2007. On balance, the ECB deserves qualified praise for its response to the crisis. The primary function of the ECB, according to the EU treaties, is to maintain “price stability” and, although inflation was far above the ECB’s self-imposed ceiling of 2% when it peaked at 4% in June and July 2008, inflation rates have since tumbled and are now at negative rates. The ECB has also steadily cut interest rates, from a peak of 4.25% in June 2008 down to 2% by January 2009 and the current rate of 1% in May, in a bid to re-invigorate lending and to kick-start the European economy. However, the ECB’s main role during the crisis has been to expand liquidity provisions in the form of a variety of loans amounting to over €500bn to effectively bail-out financial institutions. Without such financial life-support, many institutions holding our savings and pensions would undoubtedly have collapsed. But, this praise must be tempered. The ECB’s interest rate cuts were not as prompt as those taken by the likes of the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. Similarly, while the ECB’s massive cash injections have kept many institutions from collapse, the reality is that many banks have not passed on this liquidity to customers, particularly to the detriment of the small and medium sized businesses on whom economic recovery will rest. Instead, many banks have used the liquidity to buttress their own position - covering losses and, to justified public revulsion, bonus payments. However, the report is also about looking to Europe’s economic future. We need to put in place a planned ‘exit strategy’, with Member States gradually winding down their stimulus packages and the ECB drawing back the liquidity that it has provided to banks. My report concludes that such an ‘exit strategy’ in the monetary and fiscal fields should take place only after we can see a sustainable economic recovery, and calls for co-ordination on the timing of these exit strategies between Member States. Moreover, the European Commission should allow Member States to continue with their stimulus packages without forcing them to reverse this process through an over-enthusiastic early enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact. Above all, the crisis has demonstrated that markets do not always self-correct and are prone to systemic risk. In this, I support the root-and-branch reforms to the financial architecture in the EU and, in particular, the establishment of a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) - a body designed to act as a ‘watch dog’ giving an early warning of any systemic risks or imbalances in the financial markets. In this regard the most immediate priority is to provide a qualitative definition of ‘systemic risk’ - it stands to reason that you cannot identify a problem if you lack a clear definition of what it is you are looking for! Creating such models must be an urgent priority for the ECB. Above all, lessons have to be learnt from the crisis, by the ECB and other central banks, financial institutions, regulators and politicians. We must restore public confidence in financial institutions through measures which include greater transparency and better risk management. We need to ensure that a crisis of this magnitude does not repeat itself again. Prof. Edward Scicluna is a Labour MEP
My first Rapporteurship as an MEP drew closer to success this week following the committee vote on my report on the performance of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2008 and 2009, as the ECB, EU and Member States battled to limit the damage caused by the financial crisis. The result, with the draft report approved by 35 votes and just 2 against, demonstrates, I hope, that a good balance was found. Of course, while the political negotiations in the Economic and Monetary Affairs committee have been concluded, they will resume again in February when my report is debated with President Trichet and then voted in Parliament. The work is far from over. I have found the experience as a Rapporteur to be a complex and multi-faceted role. Writing the report is the easy bit! The real challenge is the lengthy negotiation with colleagues from the other political groups, with President Trichet and other high-ranking ECB officials, and with fellow colleagues in my Socialist and Democrat party group, all of whom have political ‘red-lines’ and their own ideas. Reconciling these competing positions while still retaining the integrity and coherence of the text is a fine balancing act. The report itself, needless to say, focuses on the crisis that has engulfed European countries over the past two years. The financial and economic crisis has seen the worst global economic decline since the 1930s and the most rigorous test of the ECB since its inception. After a relatively benign period of economic growth enjoyed across most of Europe for over a decade most Member States have had their economy ‘stress-tested’, not through a simulated model but in real time and with painfully real consequences. In 2008, GDP growth across the euro area was just 0.7% and, by the time my report is voted in plenary, we will have the frightening statistics of a significant economic contraction together with a forecast of a very sluggish return to growth in 2010 and 2011. Most Member States are experiencing rising budgetary deficits and soaring government debt. The Commission’s economic forecasts in May 2009 predicted average budget deficits across the eurozone of 5.3% and average government debt of 77.7%, figures which, in turn, are both expected to increase in 2010. It may take many years for these deficits, brought about by the financial crisis, to return to the levels of 2006 and 2007. On balance, the ECB deserves qualified praise for its response to the crisis. The primary function of the ECB, according to the EU treaties, is to maintain “price stability” and, although inflation was far above the ECB’s self-imposed ceiling of 2% when it peaked at 4% in June and July 2008, inflation rates have since tumbled and are now at negative rates. The ECB has also steadily cut interest rates, from a peak of 4.25% in June 2008 down to 2% by January 2009 and the current rate of 1% in May, in a bid to re-invigorate lending and to kick-start the European economy. However, the ECB’s main role during the crisis has been to expand liquidity provisions in the form of a variety of loans amounting to over €500bn to effectively bail-out financial institutions. Without such financial life-support, many institutions holding our savings and pensions would undoubtedly have collapsed. But, this praise must be tempered. The ECB’s interest rate cuts were not as prompt as those taken by the likes of the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. Similarly, while the ECB’s massive cash injections have kept many institutions from collapse, the reality is that many banks have not passed on this liquidity to customers, particularly to the detriment of the small and medium sized businesses on whom economic recovery will rest. Instead, many banks have used the liquidity to buttress their own position - covering losses and, to justified public revulsion, bonus payments. However, the report is also about looking to Europe’s economic future. We need to put in place a planned ‘exit strategy’, with Member States gradually winding down their stimulus packages and the ECB drawing back the liquidity that it has provided to banks. My report concludes that such an ‘exit strategy’ in the monetary and fiscal fields should take place only after we can see a sustainable economic recovery, and calls for co-ordination on the timing of these exit strategies between Member States. Moreover, the European Commission should allow Member States to continue with their stimulus packages without forcing them to reverse this process through an over-enthusiastic early enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact. Above all, the crisis has demonstrated that markets do not always self-correct and are prone to systemic risk. In this, I support the root-and-branch reforms to the financial architecture in the EU and, in particular, the establishment of a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) - a body designed to act as a ‘watch dog’ giving an early warning of any systemic risks or imbalances in the financial markets. In this regard the most immediate priority is to provide a qualitative definition of ‘systemic risk’ - it stands to reason that you cannot identify a problem if you lack a clear definition of what it is you are looking for! Creating such models must be an urgent priority for the ECB. Above all, lessons have to be learnt from the crisis, by the ECB and other central banks, financial institutions, regulators and politicians. We must restore public confidence in financial institutions through measures which include greater transparency and better risk management. We need to ensure that a crisis of this magnitude does not repeat itself again. Prof. Edward Scicluna is a Labour MEP
Koalizzjoni ta’ Nies Li Qegħdin f’Keffa Waħda
L-indirizz ta’ l-Ewroparlamentari Laburista, l-Professur Edward Scicluna, lid-delegati tal-Konferenza Ġenerali Annwali 2010
Inħossni onorat li qiegħed nerġa nindirizza din il-laqgħa tant importanti. Din id-darba bhala wieħed mir-rapprezentanti tagħkom fil-Parlament Ewropew. Il-mozzjoni li għandna quddiemna hija ferm aktar importanti milli wieħed jista’ jaħseb. Hija tmur għal qalba ta’ kif organizzazzjoni politika, li tgawdi l-appoġġ tal-maġġoranza tal-poplu tal-pajjiż, trid iġġedded ruħa u tikber għall-suċċessi akbar. Il-mod sempliċi kif naqraħa jien hi li bażikament l-istrutturi tal-bieraħ tal-Partit Laburista kienu tajbin għaċ-ċirkostanzi tal-bieraħ iżda llum hemm bżonn strutturi oħrajn ġodda biex jindirizzaw iċ-ċirkostanzi tal-lum. Strutturi li jinkludu l-mod kif naħsbuha u naġixxu. Biex nifhmu aħjar dan, irridu nistaqsu lilna nfusna aħna min aħna. Minn fejn ġejna. Fejn sejrin. Nafu lkoll li l-Partit Laburista twieled bħala risposta tal-ħaddiem u tal-batut għal partiti oħra ta’ dak iż-żmien li l-interess tagħhom kien tas-sinjur u tan-negozjant. Għal dawn il-partiti l-interess tal-ħaddiem żgur li ma kienx jidher fuq l-iscreen tar-radar tagħhom. Maż-żmien gvernijiet Laburisti irnexxielhom b’ħafna għaqal u bżulija jgħollu l-livell tal-ħajja tal-ħaddiem, bir-riżultat li ħafna minnhom bdew isibu ruħhom fil-klassi medja sew permezz ta’ dħul u pensjonijiet aħjar, xiri ta’ djar bi prezz baxx, kif ukoll il-professjonijiet li huma jew it-tfal tagħhom setgħu jipprattikaw permezz tal-edukazzjoni li nagħtatilhom. Ironikament pero ġara li jew il-partit laburista ma baqgħax jappella għall-dawn il-ħaddiema jew il-familja tagħhom, kif ukoll għaliex il-partit l-ieħor għaraf jilqagħhom miegħu qisu kien hemm minn dejjem. S’intendi t-tberbieq tal-flus bla rażan għin ħafna tul dawn is-snin biex kulħadd iħossu komdu u llupjat. Ir-riżultat ta’ dan l-istat ta’ fatt jafu kulħadd – medda sewwa ta’ snin bil-Partit Laburista fl-oppozizzjoni. Illum pero x’insibu? Insibu li l-klassi tal-ħaddiema, il-klassi medja u n-negozjanti, issa waqgħu f’keffa waħda u taħt madmad wieħed rifless f’tassazzjoni qawwija, b’piżijiet għoljin kawżati mill-istess djun kbar, inflazzjoni kompletament barra minn żmiena, ekonomija mfarrka, b’governanza xejn kontabbli u trasparenti u b’xamma kbira ta’ korruzzjoni. In-negozjant illum qed jinduna li l-għadu tiegħu mhuwiex aktar il-Partit tal-Ħaddiema, l-anqas l-unjon tal-ħaddiema, iżda hu l-favoritiżmu, it-taxxi u tariffi esaġerati, Il-korruzzjoni, in-nuqqas ta’ trasparenza u n-nuqqas ta’ kontabilità. Dan hu l-veru għadu li qed jipperikolalu l-għixien tiegħu u tal-familja, kif ukoll tal-impjegati tiegħu. Iżda llum kif għandu jħares il-ħaddiem lejn in-negozjant? Dak li fil-passat kien anke saħansitra seta għajru ħalliel. L-ewwelnet bħal ma l-ħaddiem irid jaqla l-għixien tiegħu, in-negozjant irid jaqla tiegħu u tan-nies li jimpjega. Il-profit hu l-mod li jirrendilu ritorn fuq l-investiment tiegħu. Dawk il-flus seta poġġihom il-bank iżda għazel li jissugrhom. Pero iktar minn hekk illum l-ekonomija tagħlimna li n-negozjant ma tikkontrollaħx billi toqgħod tippriedkalu ħalli tikkonvertiħ imma billi tikkontrollalu s-suq li jaħdem fih. Tagħmel dan billi tneħħilu l-monopolji u l-prattiċi ristrettivi. Neħħi jew ikkontrolla dawn u l-preżżijiet waħidhom isibu l-livelli ġust tagħhom. Huwa għalhekk nesiġu li jkollna Regolaturi ta’ stoffa, sew fl-ippjanar, fit-trasport u komunikazzjoni, u d-dawl u l-ilma. Dawn il-monopolji jekk ma nikkontrollawhomx ser jibqgħu jifnuna u jwaqqawna fl-għaks. Fi ftit kliem irridu strutturi tas-swieq li jinkoraġixxu l-kompetitivita’ u b’hekk jirrendu negozju ġust. In-negozju joħloq sew il-ġid u x-xogħol għall-kulħadd. Huwa f’dan l-isfond li rrid nifraħ bit-twaqqif ta’ Business Forum fi ħdan il-Partit Laburista (u hawnhekk insellem lil Marlene Mizzi u l-membri kollha fuq dan il-forum). Dan il-forum ser iwassal għal ftuħ ta’ djalogu mal-faxex kollha tas-settur tan-negozju, speċjalment is-self-employed u l-entrapriżi ż-żgħar Maltin u Għawdxin. Il-futur huwa tagħna lkoll. Ejjew ningħaqdu ħalli nibdew ħajja ġdida li tipprometti l-ġid għalina u għall-uliedna.
'Carrot and stick' approach
The Times - Saturday, 6th February 2010
The European Parliament has never avoided a debate about human rights or kept quiet for fear of hurting people's feelings. The defence of human rights lies at the heart of the EU, the creation of which was a response to World War II to ensure that the peoples of Europe resolved their political differences in parliamentary chambers and committee rooms rather than slaughtered each other on the battlefields. Sixty years on, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty means that all European law must be consistent with the political, democratic and social freedoms contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover, the fact is that, when the European Parliament makes a statement about the political or human rights situation in a third country, that country sits up and listens. Despite not being a legislative committee, the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee is still widely regarded by political groups as the most coveted parliamentary committee and, while a European Parliament debate is not legislatively binding, it is a strong statement of political intent. Another means for the European Parliament to deal with human rights issues is through its parliamentary delegations. There are over 30 delegations linking the Parliament with countries across the world - ranging from joint parliamentary assemblies such as the ACP, EuroMed and EuroLat assemblies, to joint parliamentary committees established as part of association agreements to foster cooperation, to election observation missions. These delegations closely monitor the status of human rights. In 1991, an EP delegation was the first ever to be permitted to visit Tibet, where it raised questions of human rights violations. Similarly, in the mid-1990s, the Parliament's delegation for relations with Central Asian Republics vociferously campaigned for the Parliament to delay its approval for the partnership and cooperation agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, successfully winning concessions before the Parliament finally gave its assent in 1999. Meanwhile, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, of which I am a member, cancelled its fifth session in 2002 when the ACP delegation decided to include in the Zimbabwean delegation two ministers who were on the EU travel ban list. But how does the EU ensure effectively that, outside its borders, human rights are respected? Obviously, the main "carrot" is the prospect of a bilateral free trade agreement with the largest single market in the world. But, at the same time, the "carrot" of the EU market also acts as the "stick" to stimulate reform. This combination of dialogue and the economic "carrot and stick" approach is the way which the European Parliament has so far taken to get results. The most high-profile "carrot and stick" case relates to the ongoing debate about the association agreement between the EU and Israel. Like Malta, the EU is Israel's biggest importer of goods and its second biggest exporter. In 2006, the total traded between the EU and Israel amounted to €23.5 billion. For the last few years, the EU has resisted Israeli demands to upgrade relations, demanding progress from the Israelis relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Last week, the European Parliament held a debate on relations between the EU and Tunisia, a debate that has profound, but also risky, potential consequences for the EU-Tunisia relationship. As I pointed out in the plenary session, the debate was distinctly untimely - coinciding with a visit to the Parliament of Tunisian parliamentarians, doubtless causing them much embarrassment - with some speakers focusing their remarks on condemning the Tunisian government on contentious issues between the government and civil society. The EU is Tunisia's main trading partner, accounting for about 70 per cent of Tunisian imports (€9.5 billion) and 75 per cent of Tunisia's exports (€9.9 billion), figures which have both increased significantly in recent years. As a demonstration of Tunisia's status as an established trading partner with the EU, when it removed tariffs for industrial products in 2008, it became the first Mediterranean country to enter a free trade agreement with the EU. Parallel to this there have been several recent signs of improving dialogue between Tunisia and the EU at both Commission and Parliament level. Dialogue with the Commission has included the programming of several subcommittees' meetings within the framework of the Tunisia-EU association agreement (including the Human Rights and Democracy Subcommittee) while dialogue at the level of the European Parliament took the form of the recent visit in Brussels of an important Tunisian parliamentary delegation representing four political parties represented in the Tunisian Chamber of Deputies and with the Tunisia-EP inter-parliamentary meeting scheduled for March in Brussels. There is no value in criticising and isolating Tunisia when it is evident that progress in many spheres has taken place. Causing political embarrassment for no tangible gain might give certain parliamentarians a sense of moral superiority but would do little to improve the status of the Tunisian people. Let us ensure that Tunisia and other non-EU states conform to EU standards in the economic, social, political and human rights sphere. And let us use the "carrot and stick" approach to ensure that its transition to a functioning multi-party democracy is genuine. But let us do that in a well-planned and structured dialogue. The wheels of reform are in motion. Let us let them turn smoothly without unnecessary jolts. Prof. Scicluna is a Labour member of the European Parliament.
The European Parliament has never avoided a debate about human rights or kept quiet for fear of hurting people's feelings. The defence of human rights lies at the heart of the EU, the creation of which was a response to World War II to ensure that the peoples of Europe resolved their political differences in parliamentary chambers and committee rooms rather than slaughtered each other on the battlefields. Sixty years on, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty means that all European law must be consistent with the political, democratic and social freedoms contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover, the fact is that, when the European Parliament makes a statement about the political or human rights situation in a third country, that country sits up and listens. Despite not being a legislative committee, the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee is still widely regarded by political groups as the most coveted parliamentary committee and, while a European Parliament debate is not legislatively binding, it is a strong statement of political intent. Another means for the European Parliament to deal with human rights issues is through its parliamentary delegations. There are over 30 delegations linking the Parliament with countries across the world - ranging from joint parliamentary assemblies such as the ACP, EuroMed and EuroLat assemblies, to joint parliamentary committees established as part of association agreements to foster cooperation, to election observation missions. These delegations closely monitor the status of human rights. In 1991, an EP delegation was the first ever to be permitted to visit Tibet, where it raised questions of human rights violations. Similarly, in the mid-1990s, the Parliament's delegation for relations with Central Asian Republics vociferously campaigned for the Parliament to delay its approval for the partnership and cooperation agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, successfully winning concessions before the Parliament finally gave its assent in 1999. Meanwhile, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, of which I am a member, cancelled its fifth session in 2002 when the ACP delegation decided to include in the Zimbabwean delegation two ministers who were on the EU travel ban list. But how does the EU ensure effectively that, outside its borders, human rights are respected? Obviously, the main "carrot" is the prospect of a bilateral free trade agreement with the largest single market in the world. But, at the same time, the "carrot" of the EU market also acts as the "stick" to stimulate reform. This combination of dialogue and the economic "carrot and stick" approach is the way which the European Parliament has so far taken to get results. The most high-profile "carrot and stick" case relates to the ongoing debate about the association agreement between the EU and Israel. Like Malta, the EU is Israel's biggest importer of goods and its second biggest exporter. In 2006, the total traded between the EU and Israel amounted to €23.5 billion. For the last few years, the EU has resisted Israeli demands to upgrade relations, demanding progress from the Israelis relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Last week, the European Parliament held a debate on relations between the EU and Tunisia, a debate that has profound, but also risky, potential consequences for the EU-Tunisia relationship. As I pointed out in the plenary session, the debate was distinctly untimely - coinciding with a visit to the Parliament of Tunisian parliamentarians, doubtless causing them much embarrassment - with some speakers focusing their remarks on condemning the Tunisian government on contentious issues between the government and civil society. The EU is Tunisia's main trading partner, accounting for about 70 per cent of Tunisian imports (€9.5 billion) and 75 per cent of Tunisia's exports (€9.9 billion), figures which have both increased significantly in recent years. As a demonstration of Tunisia's status as an established trading partner with the EU, when it removed tariffs for industrial products in 2008, it became the first Mediterranean country to enter a free trade agreement with the EU. Parallel to this there have been several recent signs of improving dialogue between Tunisia and the EU at both Commission and Parliament level. Dialogue with the Commission has included the programming of several subcommittees' meetings within the framework of the Tunisia-EU association agreement (including the Human Rights and Democracy Subcommittee) while dialogue at the level of the European Parliament took the form of the recent visit in Brussels of an important Tunisian parliamentary delegation representing four political parties represented in the Tunisian Chamber of Deputies and with the Tunisia-EP inter-parliamentary meeting scheduled for March in Brussels. There is no value in criticising and isolating Tunisia when it is evident that progress in many spheres has taken place. Causing political embarrassment for no tangible gain might give certain parliamentarians a sense of moral superiority but would do little to improve the status of the Tunisian people. Let us ensure that Tunisia and other non-EU states conform to EU standards in the economic, social, political and human rights sphere. And let us use the "carrot and stick" approach to ensure that its transition to a functioning multi-party democracy is genuine. But let us do that in a well-planned and structured dialogue. The wheels of reform are in motion. Let us let them turn smoothly without unnecessary jolts. Prof. Scicluna is a Labour member of the European Parliament.
Il-bażi tar-regolamentazzjoni tal-utilitajiet
www.l-orizzont.com - Is-Sibt 6 ta' Frar 2010
Fl-istorja, li issa ilha għad dejja, dwar iż-żidiet qawwijin fit-tariffi tad-dawl u tal-ilma u li riċentement kienet is-suġġett ta’ laqgħa turbulenti tal-MCESD, ma jistax ma jkunx innotat kemm il-Gvern jibqa’ stinat li jirrifjuta li jid diskuti t-tariffi nfushom anke jekk b’xi forma ta’ kumpens parzjali jipprova jtaffi xi ftit mill-weġgħat ikkawżati mit-tariffi. Huwa ferm diżappuntanti li tara li l-każ li qegħdin iġibu ’l quddiem l-imsieħba soċjali fil-laqgħat tal-MCESD ikun ridott għall-effett detrimentali li dawn iż-żidiet se jkollhom fuq in-negozji u l-impjiegi rispettivament. Dan wieħed jasal biex jif hmu. Madankollu l-MCESD issa nbidel fi speċi ta’ suq fejn l-operaturi jipprovaw jieħdu l-aħjar prezz li jistgħu, mingħand il-Gvern flok jiġġieldu għall-prinċipji ekonomiċi bażiċi li fuq hom irridu nibnu ekonomija effiċjenti u soda għal quddiem. Ma jfissirx li fil-passat l-imsieħba soċjali ma ressqux ’il quddiem argumenti mill-aspetti finanzjarji u ekonomiċi. Imma pożizzjonijiet bħal dawn, kemm mill-unjins tal-ħaddiema kif ukoll mill-għaqdiet ta’ min iħaddem, sabu lill-Gvern adamanti fuq kemm hi korretta l-istrateġija tiegħu fejn jidħlu t-tariffi. Din hi ħasra. Ghax jekk m’aħ niex ċari dwar il-prinċipji ekonomiċi li għandhom jiggwidaw lejn għażla ta’ strateġija korretta fejn jidħlu tariffi għall-utilitajiet pubbliċi, allura se jinħolqu preċedenti ħżiena. L-ekonomija tas-suq (imsejħa micro-econo mics) hija kompletament mibnija fuq kif għandna nħarsu li l-prezzijiet fl-istess suq għandhom ikunu korretti. Jekk le, l-ekonomija ssofri għax titlef ħafna mill-effiċjenza tagħha. Il-prinċipju li fuqu l-Gvern qed jibbaża l-istrateġija tiegħu fejn jidħlu tariffi ma setax ikun preżentat aħjar minn kif pre żen tat f’artiklu li kiteb b’kon vin zjoni riċentement fil-ġurnal The Times l-Avukat Austin Gatt, Ministru għall-Infrastrut tura, Trasport u Komunikazzjoni. Il-Ministru Gatt kiteb li “hemm involut punt ta’ prinċipju li nemmen li huwa fundamentali biex tifhem kif għandu jopera tibdil fit-tariffi. L-ewwel prinċipju huwa li, huma ta’ liema natura huma t-tariffi, dawn għandhom jagħmlu tajjeb għall-ispiża operazzjonali kollha u jipprovdu lill-operatur b’ritorn adekwat fuq l-investiment. Din mhix sem pliċi kwistjoni ta’ regolamentazzjoni tal-Unjoni Ewropea u liġi lokali, imma wkoll kwistjoni li tagħmel sens ekonomiku.” L-ewwel osservazzjoni tiegħi hi li dan l-argument ma fihx xi principju ġdid. Huwa fil-fatt l-argument tipiku li kull operatur monopolistiku jressaq ’il qud diem għall-attenzjoni tar-Re golatur. Huwa ċar daqs il-kristall li l-Ministru qed jiddefendi l-pożizzjoni tal-EneMalta kif għamlu ħafna ministri qablu sa mill-bidu tas-snin 80. Ħafna ministri saru ħaġa waħda mal-monopolji parastatali u korporazzjonijiet li jaqgħu taħthom b’tali mod li ħafna drabi spiċċaw ċermen tagħhom de facto. Mhux ta’ b’xejn li ħafna snin qabel is-sħubija fl-Unjoni Ewropea, madwar 18-il sena ilu, fi studju li għamilt għall-Federazzjoni tal-Industriji (FOI) fuq l-istrutturar tal-ekonomija, insistejt b’qawwa li għandhom jitwaqqfu Regolaturi Nazzjonali biex jieħdu f’idejhom il-prattiċi tal-Ministri biex ma jibqgħux preġudikati. Ejjew neżaminaw id-duttrina l-ġdida tal-Ministru Gatt fir-rigward ta’ ffissar ta’ tariffi. Tista’ timmaġina li tagħmel sens li xi operatur f’suq kompetittiv, hu x’inhu l-ġeneru ta’ negozju tiegħu kemm jekk għas-suq lokali kif ukoll għall-esportazzjoni, jitlob, U, jippretendi li jingħata tariffa li tkun tkopri l-ispiża sħiħa tal-operazzjoni tan-negozju u ritorn adekwat fuq l-investiment tiegħu? Veru jkun joħlom jekk jaħseb li dan jista’ jsir bi dritt! Il-mod ta’ kif fil-verità jaħdem is-suq għandu punt ta’ tluq differenti minn hekk. L-operatur f’suq kompetittiv, iffaċċjat mill-prezz tas-suq, irid, biex isalva, jimmira li jniżżel l-ispiża għal dak li s-suq jiflaħ iġorr, bit-tama li dan iħallilu ritorn diċenti biex ikun jista’ jkompli jaħdem. Għal dan ma tingħata ebda garanzija. La d-di rettiva tal-Unjoni Ewropea, la l-liġi Maltija u lanqas is-sens komun ma jistgħu jiggarantixxu li s-suq kompetittiv se tiġih ħniena minn xi operatur biex iżommu fin-negozju billi jkoprilu l-ispiża operazzjonali b’ritorn adegwat fuqha. Monopolju mhux regolat m’għandux dawn il-limitazzjonijiet tas-suq u jsir theddida għall-effiċjenza ekonomika u għas-soċjetà kollha jekk jitħalla juża l-kriterji tiegħu biex jasal għal prezzijiet monopolistiċi bbażati fuq is-sens egoistiku tiegħu. Huwa hawn li għandu jaġixxi r-Regolatur meta konfrontat b’operatur li, għal raġunijiet varji, m’għandux kompetizzjoni fis-suq tiegħu. Ir-regola hija sempliċi ħafna. Ir-Regolatur għandu jassigura li jistabbilixxi t-tariffi tal-monopolji f’livell li kien is-suq kieku kien jeżisti. Iffaċċjat minn dan il-prezz tar-Regolatur l-operatur monopolistiku, bħall-EneMalta, għandu mbagħad ikun sforzat inaqqas l-ispiża biex jassigura li jkun hemm ‘surplus’ adekwat biex b’hekk ikompli bl-investi ment tiegħu. F’Malta r-Regolatur għadu ma sabx saqajh, bil-konsegwenza li d-deciżjonijiet tal-Kor porazzjoni fejn jidhlu tariffi u investiment huma fid-deskrizzjoni, kif jgħoġbu, il-Ministru tal-ġurnata. Mhux sorpriża li l-korporazzjonijiet pubbliċi tagħna qegħdin jiffaċċjaw problemi kbar finanzjarji u ta’ investiment. Imma min għandu jagħmel tajjeb għad-differenza fid-dħul miġbur mit-tariffa li Regolatur, mgħammar adekwatament u indipendenti, jasal għaliha bħala adekwata, u l-ispiża operazzjonali li tressaq ’il quddiem il-korporazzjoni kawża ta’ ineffiċjenzi maniġerjali, tekniċi u ekonomiċi, passati u preżenti? Mill-ġdid, hawnhekk insibu konfużjoni fil-mod kif jaħseb il-Gvern, għalkemm il-prinċipji mressqin mill-Ministru huma ċari biżżejjed. Għal kemm konvinċenti wkoll, sfortunatament mhux ħielsa milli jinkisru wkoll. Jagħmel tajjeb għal din l-ineffiċjenza ċara huwa dak li jissejjaħ “sussidju”, forma ta’ rigal lill-produtturi privati u konsumaturi. Is-soċjetà fis-sens wiesa’ tagħ ha jkollha tħallas għad-dnubiet ekonomiċi tal-im għoddi. Imma l-piż finanzjarju ghandu jithallas bl-aktar mod newtrali li nistgħu nsibu fis-sistema ta’ tassazzjoni tagħ na, b’mod li l-piż jinqasam. Meta nagħmlu hekk għandna nassiguraw li l-prezzijiet relattivi għal materja prima bħaż-żejt ma jkunx hemm tbagħbis magħhom. Qegħdin f’suq kompetittiv immens fejn jirrigwarda manifattura, turiżmu u servizzi finanzjarji. Traqqigħ tas-sistema tagħna tal-prezzijiet jista’ jsir biss b’detriment għall-oqsma ekonomiċi u soċjali tagħna.
Fl-istorja, li issa ilha għad dejja, dwar iż-żidiet qawwijin fit-tariffi tad-dawl u tal-ilma u li riċentement kienet is-suġġett ta’ laqgħa turbulenti tal-MCESD, ma jistax ma jkunx innotat kemm il-Gvern jibqa’ stinat li jirrifjuta li jid diskuti t-tariffi nfushom anke jekk b’xi forma ta’ kumpens parzjali jipprova jtaffi xi ftit mill-weġgħat ikkawżati mit-tariffi. Huwa ferm diżappuntanti li tara li l-każ li qegħdin iġibu ’l quddiem l-imsieħba soċjali fil-laqgħat tal-MCESD ikun ridott għall-effett detrimentali li dawn iż-żidiet se jkollhom fuq in-negozji u l-impjiegi rispettivament. Dan wieħed jasal biex jif hmu. Madankollu l-MCESD issa nbidel fi speċi ta’ suq fejn l-operaturi jipprovaw jieħdu l-aħjar prezz li jistgħu, mingħand il-Gvern flok jiġġieldu għall-prinċipji ekonomiċi bażiċi li fuq hom irridu nibnu ekonomija effiċjenti u soda għal quddiem. Ma jfissirx li fil-passat l-imsieħba soċjali ma ressqux ’il quddiem argumenti mill-aspetti finanzjarji u ekonomiċi. Imma pożizzjonijiet bħal dawn, kemm mill-unjins tal-ħaddiema kif ukoll mill-għaqdiet ta’ min iħaddem, sabu lill-Gvern adamanti fuq kemm hi korretta l-istrateġija tiegħu fejn jidħlu t-tariffi. Din hi ħasra. Ghax jekk m’aħ niex ċari dwar il-prinċipji ekonomiċi li għandhom jiggwidaw lejn għażla ta’ strateġija korretta fejn jidħlu tariffi għall-utilitajiet pubbliċi, allura se jinħolqu preċedenti ħżiena. L-ekonomija tas-suq (imsejħa micro-econo mics) hija kompletament mibnija fuq kif għandna nħarsu li l-prezzijiet fl-istess suq għandhom ikunu korretti. Jekk le, l-ekonomija ssofri għax titlef ħafna mill-effiċjenza tagħha. Il-prinċipju li fuqu l-Gvern qed jibbaża l-istrateġija tiegħu fejn jidħlu tariffi ma setax ikun preżentat aħjar minn kif pre żen tat f’artiklu li kiteb b’kon vin zjoni riċentement fil-ġurnal The Times l-Avukat Austin Gatt, Ministru għall-Infrastrut tura, Trasport u Komunikazzjoni. Il-Ministru Gatt kiteb li “hemm involut punt ta’ prinċipju li nemmen li huwa fundamentali biex tifhem kif għandu jopera tibdil fit-tariffi. L-ewwel prinċipju huwa li, huma ta’ liema natura huma t-tariffi, dawn għandhom jagħmlu tajjeb għall-ispiża operazzjonali kollha u jipprovdu lill-operatur b’ritorn adekwat fuq l-investiment. Din mhix sem pliċi kwistjoni ta’ regolamentazzjoni tal-Unjoni Ewropea u liġi lokali, imma wkoll kwistjoni li tagħmel sens ekonomiku.” L-ewwel osservazzjoni tiegħi hi li dan l-argument ma fihx xi principju ġdid. Huwa fil-fatt l-argument tipiku li kull operatur monopolistiku jressaq ’il qud diem għall-attenzjoni tar-Re golatur. Huwa ċar daqs il-kristall li l-Ministru qed jiddefendi l-pożizzjoni tal-EneMalta kif għamlu ħafna ministri qablu sa mill-bidu tas-snin 80. Ħafna ministri saru ħaġa waħda mal-monopolji parastatali u korporazzjonijiet li jaqgħu taħthom b’tali mod li ħafna drabi spiċċaw ċermen tagħhom de facto. Mhux ta’ b’xejn li ħafna snin qabel is-sħubija fl-Unjoni Ewropea, madwar 18-il sena ilu, fi studju li għamilt għall-Federazzjoni tal-Industriji (FOI) fuq l-istrutturar tal-ekonomija, insistejt b’qawwa li għandhom jitwaqqfu Regolaturi Nazzjonali biex jieħdu f’idejhom il-prattiċi tal-Ministri biex ma jibqgħux preġudikati. Ejjew neżaminaw id-duttrina l-ġdida tal-Ministru Gatt fir-rigward ta’ ffissar ta’ tariffi. Tista’ timmaġina li tagħmel sens li xi operatur f’suq kompetittiv, hu x’inhu l-ġeneru ta’ negozju tiegħu kemm jekk għas-suq lokali kif ukoll għall-esportazzjoni, jitlob, U, jippretendi li jingħata tariffa li tkun tkopri l-ispiża sħiħa tal-operazzjoni tan-negozju u ritorn adekwat fuq l-investiment tiegħu? Veru jkun joħlom jekk jaħseb li dan jista’ jsir bi dritt! Il-mod ta’ kif fil-verità jaħdem is-suq għandu punt ta’ tluq differenti minn hekk. L-operatur f’suq kompetittiv, iffaċċjat mill-prezz tas-suq, irid, biex isalva, jimmira li jniżżel l-ispiża għal dak li s-suq jiflaħ iġorr, bit-tama li dan iħallilu ritorn diċenti biex ikun jista’ jkompli jaħdem. Għal dan ma tingħata ebda garanzija. La d-di rettiva tal-Unjoni Ewropea, la l-liġi Maltija u lanqas is-sens komun ma jistgħu jiggarantixxu li s-suq kompetittiv se tiġih ħniena minn xi operatur biex iżommu fin-negozju billi jkoprilu l-ispiża operazzjonali b’ritorn adegwat fuqha. Monopolju mhux regolat m’għandux dawn il-limitazzjonijiet tas-suq u jsir theddida għall-effiċjenza ekonomika u għas-soċjetà kollha jekk jitħalla juża l-kriterji tiegħu biex jasal għal prezzijiet monopolistiċi bbażati fuq is-sens egoistiku tiegħu. Huwa hawn li għandu jaġixxi r-Regolatur meta konfrontat b’operatur li, għal raġunijiet varji, m’għandux kompetizzjoni fis-suq tiegħu. Ir-regola hija sempliċi ħafna. Ir-Regolatur għandu jassigura li jistabbilixxi t-tariffi tal-monopolji f’livell li kien is-suq kieku kien jeżisti. Iffaċċjat minn dan il-prezz tar-Regolatur l-operatur monopolistiku, bħall-EneMalta, għandu mbagħad ikun sforzat inaqqas l-ispiża biex jassigura li jkun hemm ‘surplus’ adekwat biex b’hekk ikompli bl-investi ment tiegħu. F’Malta r-Regolatur għadu ma sabx saqajh, bil-konsegwenza li d-deciżjonijiet tal-Kor porazzjoni fejn jidhlu tariffi u investiment huma fid-deskrizzjoni, kif jgħoġbu, il-Ministru tal-ġurnata. Mhux sorpriża li l-korporazzjonijiet pubbliċi tagħna qegħdin jiffaċċjaw problemi kbar finanzjarji u ta’ investiment. Imma min għandu jagħmel tajjeb għad-differenza fid-dħul miġbur mit-tariffa li Regolatur, mgħammar adekwatament u indipendenti, jasal għaliha bħala adekwata, u l-ispiża operazzjonali li tressaq ’il quddiem il-korporazzjoni kawża ta’ ineffiċjenzi maniġerjali, tekniċi u ekonomiċi, passati u preżenti? Mill-ġdid, hawnhekk insibu konfużjoni fil-mod kif jaħseb il-Gvern, għalkemm il-prinċipji mressqin mill-Ministru huma ċari biżżejjed. Għal kemm konvinċenti wkoll, sfortunatament mhux ħielsa milli jinkisru wkoll. Jagħmel tajjeb għal din l-ineffiċjenza ċara huwa dak li jissejjaħ “sussidju”, forma ta’ rigal lill-produtturi privati u konsumaturi. Is-soċjetà fis-sens wiesa’ tagħ ha jkollha tħallas għad-dnubiet ekonomiċi tal-im għoddi. Imma l-piż finanzjarju ghandu jithallas bl-aktar mod newtrali li nistgħu nsibu fis-sistema ta’ tassazzjoni tagħ na, b’mod li l-piż jinqasam. Meta nagħmlu hekk għandna nassiguraw li l-prezzijiet relattivi għal materja prima bħaż-żejt ma jkunx hemm tbagħbis magħhom. Qegħdin f’suq kompetittiv immens fejn jirrigwarda manifattura, turiżmu u servizzi finanzjarji. Traqqigħ tas-sistema tagħna tal-prezzijiet jista’ jsir biss b’detriment għall-oqsma ekonomiċi u soċjali tagħna.
Is Greece eurozone's Iceland?
The Times - Friday, 11th December 2009
The financial crisis has taken many casualties. Aside from the impact that the recession has had on all countries across the world, two particular cases stand out. In 2008, Iceland's sudden prosperity built around its banking sector collapsed and the country effectively went bust. Last week, the collapse of the state-owned company Dubai World brought Dubai to its knees. Investors are starting to seriously worry about the possibility of more countries defaulting on their debts. In the euro-area, there is one country that everyone is talking about as the likeliest candidate: Greece. So, will Greece become the eurozone's Iceland and default on its debt? There is no doubt that Greece is in terrible economic trouble. Prices on credit default swaps tied to Greece, which are essentially used as insurance against bad government debt, are rising and its credit rating has already been downgraded from A to A-. Meanwhile, the difference in bond market spreads between Greek government bonds and German bonds has also increased rapidly despite the fact that Greece already paid significantly more on its government bond spreads than other EU countries. Their new Finance Minister, George Papaconstantinou, went as far as to write an article in last week's Wall Street Journal in a bid to reassure investors and commentators that, while the country was in recession and facing a grave fiscal situation, it would not go bankrupt. Of course, the "Greek problem" is not new. Greece has spent most of this decade living with spiralling government debt and high Budget deficits. On the latter point, the outgoing conservative government bequeathed to its socialist successor books that were cooked. This year's Budget deficit is now expected to be 12.7 per cent of GDP as opposed to the eight per cent stated by the outgoing Administration. Greece's government debt is projected to rise to 135 per cent by 2011. Greece, like Italy and several other member states, viewed the eurozone as a modern day "Noah's Ark" that would save them from financial turmoil. Like Malta, they took short-term measures to ensure that they joined the euro swiftly but did not make the deeper structural reforms to ensure greater labour market flexibility and productivity and the sustainability of their public sector programmes. However, the socialist government has demonstrated that it understands the gravity of the situation and is ready to act. Prime Minister George Papandreou, just a week after being elected in October, admitted that his country's economy was "in intensive care" adding that Greece was facing "the worst economic crisis since the restoration of democracy". Moreover, Mr Papandreou has the advantage that Greek public opinion know the mess that his government inherited and this should give him public support to make necessary but normally unpopular policy reforms. He has proposed a draft Budget for 2010 that includes a €3 billion fiscal stimulus programme and higher spending in education and health but stiff spending cuts elsewhere. These include a 25 per cent reduction in government consumption spending, a civil service hiring freeze in 2010, whereby only one new worker will be hired for every five who retire, and cuts to defence spending. They have also promised to grasp the nettle of pension reform and measures to tackle tax evasion. The Greek government expects these budgetary measures to reduce the deficit to 9.1 per cent by the end of next year. Still, these are fine words but they need to be matched by results. The response of financial markets indicates that they are far from convinced. One thing is for sure: they can expect few favours from the EU. The EU's Stability and Growth Pact, which stipulates that countries should keep government debt levels below 60 per cent and Budget deficits below three per cent, has taken a real battering during the crisis. Virtually all EU countries, including Malta, have breached the terms of the SGP and the Commission and the European Central Bank are desperate to ensure that their rules encouraging fiscal prudence are not completely abandoned. At the meeting of European finance ministers last week, Greece braced itself for stiff penalties. In other words, it is quite possible that a supplementary Budget, delivering further deficit cuts will be demanded. But I still think it is unlikely that Greece will go bust. As a member of the eurozone, it will not be allowed to and the ECB's president, Jean-Claude Trichet, continues to brush aside questions from journalists about the possibility of a eurozone country going bankrupt. For one thing, the eurozone is as much about political union as it is economic and monetary union. For a country to effectively drop out of the eurozone would be profoundly embarrassing for the EU. So, after all, can one say that being a euro member indeed offers a certain protection from sovereign debt default? Not so fast. The answer is in the affirmative but not for reasons implied by the "Noah's Ark" school. In fact, default is unlikely due to a combination of market discipline, peer pressure and the EU's SGP. It is through enormous sacrifices and painful policy measures "forced" on a eurozone country that will finally save it from bankruptcy. There will definitely be no soft bail-outs from the EU. Nonetheless, Greece's predicament should serve a salutary warning to others, including Malta. Running up huge government debts and Budget deficits, cooking the books with creative accounting and treating euro membership as though it provides you with a blank cheque, catches up with you eventually. Without credible public finances and fiscal and monetary discipline, a sustainable return to growth and normality is no more than a pipedream in or outside the eurozone. Prof. Scicluna is a Labour member of the European Parliament
The financial crisis has taken many casualties. Aside from the impact that the recession has had on all countries across the world, two particular cases stand out. In 2008, Iceland's sudden prosperity built around its banking sector collapsed and the country effectively went bust. Last week, the collapse of the state-owned company Dubai World brought Dubai to its knees. Investors are starting to seriously worry about the possibility of more countries defaulting on their debts. In the euro-area, there is one country that everyone is talking about as the likeliest candidate: Greece. So, will Greece become the eurozone's Iceland and default on its debt? There is no doubt that Greece is in terrible economic trouble. Prices on credit default swaps tied to Greece, which are essentially used as insurance against bad government debt, are rising and its credit rating has already been downgraded from A to A-. Meanwhile, the difference in bond market spreads between Greek government bonds and German bonds has also increased rapidly despite the fact that Greece already paid significantly more on its government bond spreads than other EU countries. Their new Finance Minister, George Papaconstantinou, went as far as to write an article in last week's Wall Street Journal in a bid to reassure investors and commentators that, while the country was in recession and facing a grave fiscal situation, it would not go bankrupt. Of course, the "Greek problem" is not new. Greece has spent most of this decade living with spiralling government debt and high Budget deficits. On the latter point, the outgoing conservative government bequeathed to its socialist successor books that were cooked. This year's Budget deficit is now expected to be 12.7 per cent of GDP as opposed to the eight per cent stated by the outgoing Administration. Greece's government debt is projected to rise to 135 per cent by 2011. Greece, like Italy and several other member states, viewed the eurozone as a modern day "Noah's Ark" that would save them from financial turmoil. Like Malta, they took short-term measures to ensure that they joined the euro swiftly but did not make the deeper structural reforms to ensure greater labour market flexibility and productivity and the sustainability of their public sector programmes. However, the socialist government has demonstrated that it understands the gravity of the situation and is ready to act. Prime Minister George Papandreou, just a week after being elected in October, admitted that his country's economy was "in intensive care" adding that Greece was facing "the worst economic crisis since the restoration of democracy". Moreover, Mr Papandreou has the advantage that Greek public opinion know the mess that his government inherited and this should give him public support to make necessary but normally unpopular policy reforms. He has proposed a draft Budget for 2010 that includes a €3 billion fiscal stimulus programme and higher spending in education and health but stiff spending cuts elsewhere. These include a 25 per cent reduction in government consumption spending, a civil service hiring freeze in 2010, whereby only one new worker will be hired for every five who retire, and cuts to defence spending. They have also promised to grasp the nettle of pension reform and measures to tackle tax evasion. The Greek government expects these budgetary measures to reduce the deficit to 9.1 per cent by the end of next year. Still, these are fine words but they need to be matched by results. The response of financial markets indicates that they are far from convinced. One thing is for sure: they can expect few favours from the EU. The EU's Stability and Growth Pact, which stipulates that countries should keep government debt levels below 60 per cent and Budget deficits below three per cent, has taken a real battering during the crisis. Virtually all EU countries, including Malta, have breached the terms of the SGP and the Commission and the European Central Bank are desperate to ensure that their rules encouraging fiscal prudence are not completely abandoned. At the meeting of European finance ministers last week, Greece braced itself for stiff penalties. In other words, it is quite possible that a supplementary Budget, delivering further deficit cuts will be demanded. But I still think it is unlikely that Greece will go bust. As a member of the eurozone, it will not be allowed to and the ECB's president, Jean-Claude Trichet, continues to brush aside questions from journalists about the possibility of a eurozone country going bankrupt. For one thing, the eurozone is as much about political union as it is economic and monetary union. For a country to effectively drop out of the eurozone would be profoundly embarrassing for the EU. So, after all, can one say that being a euro member indeed offers a certain protection from sovereign debt default? Not so fast. The answer is in the affirmative but not for reasons implied by the "Noah's Ark" school. In fact, default is unlikely due to a combination of market discipline, peer pressure and the EU's SGP. It is through enormous sacrifices and painful policy measures "forced" on a eurozone country that will finally save it from bankruptcy. There will definitely be no soft bail-outs from the EU. Nonetheless, Greece's predicament should serve a salutary warning to others, including Malta. Running up huge government debts and Budget deficits, cooking the books with creative accounting and treating euro membership as though it provides you with a blank cheque, catches up with you eventually. Without credible public finances and fiscal and monetary discipline, a sustainable return to growth and normality is no more than a pipedream in or outside the eurozone. Prof. Scicluna is a Labour member of the European Parliament
Il-Greċja: l-Islanda taż-Żona Ewro?
l-orizzont - Is-Sibt 19 ta' Diċembru 2009
IL-KRIŻI finanzjarja ħalliet ħafna vittmi. Apparti l-impatt li r-riċessjoni kellha fuq il-pajjiżi kollha tad-dinja, jispikkaw żewġ każi partikolari. Fis-sena 2008 il-prosperità mibnija f’daqqa fuq is-settur bankarju li esperjenzat l-Islanda, ikkollassat, u l-pajjiż effettivament falla. Ftit tal-jiem ilu l-waqgħa tal-kumpanija statali Dubai World niżżlet lil Dubai għarkuptejh. L-investi¬turi issa qegħdin jitħassbu serjament dwar il-possibiltà li jkun hemm pajjiżi oħrajn li jgħaddu mill-istess esperjenza kawża tad-djun tagħhom. Fiz-Żona Ewro hemm pajjiż wieħed li kulħadd qed jitħasseb dwaru bħala li jista’ jgħaddi mill-istess esperjenza: il-Greċja. Wieħed jistaqsi: il-Greċja se tkun l-Islanda taż-Żona Ewro u tbatti taħt id-djun tagħha? M’hemm ebda dubju li l-Greċja tinsab f’inkwiet ekono¬miku kbir ħafna. Sitwazzjoni li wasslet biex jitbaxxa l-livell ta’ ‘credit rating’ tal-Greċja, li minn A tniżżel għal A-. Sadanittant id-differenza fir-rati tal-imgħax fuq il-bonds kompliet tiżdied bejn il-bonds tal-Gvern Grieg u dawk Ġer¬maniżi kompliet tit¬wessa, minkejja l-fatt li l-Greċja diġà ħallset ferm aktar fuq il-bonds tagħha minn kull pajjiż ieħor tal-Unjoni Ewropea. Il-Ministru tal-Finanzi l-ġdid tal-Greċja, George Papa¬constantinou, wasal biex jikteb artiklu fil-Wall Street Journal fi sforz biex jassigura lill-investituri u lill-kummentaturi finanzjarji li waqt li l-pajjiż jinsab f’riċessjoni u qed jiffaċċja sitwazzjoni fiskali gravi, il-Greċja mhux se tfalli. Huwa veru li l-“problema Griega” mhix xi ħaġa ġdida. Il-Greċja għaddiet parti kbira minn dawn l-aħħar għaxar snin bi djun dejjem jikbru u b’defiċits fil-baġits għoljin mmens. Dwar dan id-defiċit il-Gvern Soċjalista attwali wiret mingħand il-Gvern Konservattiv “kotba mbagħbsin”. Id-defiċit għal din is-sena mistenni jkun jammonta għal 12.7% tal-Prodott Gross Domestiku, kuntrarjament għal 8% kif kien dikjarat mill-Gvern Konservattiv. Huwa pproġettat li sas-sena 2011 id-dejn tal-Gvern Grieg mistenni jkun tela’ għal 135%. Il-Greċja, bħall-Italja u ħafna pajjiżi oħrajn tal-Unjoni Ewro¬pea, kienu qegħdin iħarsu lejn iż-Żona Ewro bħala l-verżjoni moderna tal-Arka ta’ Noe li ssalvahom mid-diżastru finanzjarju. Bħal Malta, il-Greċja ħadet miżuri fil-qosor biex tassigura li tin¬għaqad mal-Ewro malajr, imma m’għamlitx ir-riformi strutturali fil-fond biex tassigura pro¬dut¬tività akbar kif ukoll is-sostenn tal-programmi tas-settur pubbliku. Madankollu, il-Gvern Soċjalista Grieg wera li fehem il-gravità tas-sitwazzjoni u hu lest li jaġixxi. Il-Prim Ministru Grieg, George Papandreou, ġimgħa biss wara li ngħata s-setgħa f’Ottubru li ghadda, ammetta li l-ekonomija ta’ pajjiżu kienet “fil-kura intensiva” u żied li l-Greċja kienet qed tiffaċċja “l-agħar kriżi ekonomika mir-ritorn għad-demokrazija”. Papandreou għandu l-vantaġġ li l-opinjoni pubblika hija konxja tad-diżastru li wiret il-Gvern tiegħu u dan għandu jagħtih l-appoġġ pubbliku għall-miżuri meħtieġa imma mhux popolari. Il-Prim Ministru Grieg ippropona abbozz ta’ baġit li filwaqt li jinkludi programm ta’ stimulu finanzjarju ta’ tliet biljun ewro; nefqa akbar fl-edukaz¬zjoni u s-saħħa, fl-istess ħin tnaqqis fin-nefqa f’oqsma oħra. Miżuri li jinkludu tnaqqis ta’ 25% fuq il-konsum tal-Gvern; iffriżar fuq l-impjiegi fis-servizz ċivili, b’mod li jkun impjegat wieħed għal kull ħames impjiegi li jispiċċaw bl-età tal-irtirar; kif ukoll tnaqqis fin-nefqa għad-difiża. Il-Gvern wiegħed ukoll riforma fil-pensjoni u miżuri biex tkun miġġielda l-evażjoni tat-taxxa. Il-Gvern Grieg qed jittama li b’riżultat ta’ dawn il-miżuri, sa tmiem is-sena 2010 id-deficit ikun tniżżel għal 9.1%. Tamiet sbieħ li għad iridu jkunu kumplimentati bir-riżultati. Ir-reazzjoni tas-swieq finanzjarji turi li huma ferm bogħod minn konvinti. Ħaġa waħda hija ċerta: il-Greċja, u min hu bħalha, ma jistgħux jistennew wisq favuri mill-Unjoni Ewropea. Il-Patt tal-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Istabilità u Tkabbir (SGP), li jistipula li l-pajjiżi membri għandhom iżommu l-livelli tad-djun taħt is-60% u d-defiċit tal-baġit taħt it-3%, ħa daqqa sewwa waqt il-kriżi. Fil-verità l-pajjiżi kollha tal-Unjoni Ewropea, inkluż Malta, kisru dak li jgħid l-SGP, bil-Kummissjoni u l-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew f’attentati ddisprati biex jassiguraw li r-regoli tagħhom li jinkoraġġixxu pru¬denza fiskali ma jkunux abbandunati totalment. Fil-laqgħa tal-Ministri tal-Finanzi Ewropej ta’ ftit jiem ilu, il-Greċja ppreparat lilha nnifis¬ha għal penalitajiet iebsin. Fi kliem ieħor, huwa possibbli li l-Greċja tintalab tagħmel baġit supplimentari li fih jintalab aktar tnaqqis. Jien xorta għadni nemmen li l-Greċja ssalva. Bħala mem¬bru taz-Żona Ewro mhux se tit¬ħalla ma ssalvax, bil-President tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew, Trichet, ikompli jwarrab mistoqsijiet tal-ġurnalisti dwar il-possibiltà li pajjiż fl-Ewro jispiċċa fallut. Iż-Żona Ewro hija għaqda po¬litika daqskemm hija għaqda ekonomika u finanzjarja. Ikun imbaraz¬zanti ferm għall-Unjoni Ewropea kieku kellu jiġri li pajjiż jaqa’ mill-Ewro. Allura wara kollox, wieħed jista’ jgħid li l-fatt li tkun mem¬bru tal-Ewro jiggarantixxi protezzjoni milli ċċedi taħt id-dejn nazzjonali? Mhux daqs¬tant b’mod mgħaġġel. It-tweġiba hija fl-affermattiv, imma mhux għar-raġunijiet implikati minn dawk li jsostnu l-verżjoni tal-Arka ta’ Noe. Filfatt is-salvazzjoni, jekk, u meta sseħħ, se sseħħ b’riżultat ta’ dixxiplina mis-suq, mir-’Rating Agencies’ u mill-IMF, minn pressjoni tal-Patt tal-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Istabilità u t-Tkabbir… kollha flimkien. Huwa permezz ta’ sagrifiċċji enormi u miżuri iebsin furzati fuq pajjiż membru taż-Żona Ewro li finalment iwasslu biex isalvaw pajjiż minn falliment. Definittivament l-Unjoni Ewropea mhux se sservi ta’ salvatur faċli. Minkejja kollox, l-istorja Griega għandha sservi ta’ twissija b’saħħitha lil pajjiżi membri oħrajn, fosthom Malta. It-tkabbir tad-djun u d-defiċits tal-baġit, tbagħbis tal-kotba u l-fehma li sħubija fl-Ewro se tipprovdi ċekk mif¬tuħ, eventwalment iwassluk għal saram kbir. Mingħajr finanzi pubbliċi kredibbli u dixxiplina fiskali u monetarja, ir-ritorn sostenibbli għal tkabbir ekonomiku u normalità m’huma xejn aktar minn ħolma sew jekk tkun membru taż-Żona Ewro kif ukoll jekk tkun barra.
IL-KRIŻI finanzjarja ħalliet ħafna vittmi. Apparti l-impatt li r-riċessjoni kellha fuq il-pajjiżi kollha tad-dinja, jispikkaw żewġ każi partikolari. Fis-sena 2008 il-prosperità mibnija f’daqqa fuq is-settur bankarju li esperjenzat l-Islanda, ikkollassat, u l-pajjiż effettivament falla. Ftit tal-jiem ilu l-waqgħa tal-kumpanija statali Dubai World niżżlet lil Dubai għarkuptejh. L-investi¬turi issa qegħdin jitħassbu serjament dwar il-possibiltà li jkun hemm pajjiżi oħrajn li jgħaddu mill-istess esperjenza kawża tad-djun tagħhom. Fiz-Żona Ewro hemm pajjiż wieħed li kulħadd qed jitħasseb dwaru bħala li jista’ jgħaddi mill-istess esperjenza: il-Greċja. Wieħed jistaqsi: il-Greċja se tkun l-Islanda taż-Żona Ewro u tbatti taħt id-djun tagħha? M’hemm ebda dubju li l-Greċja tinsab f’inkwiet ekono¬miku kbir ħafna. Sitwazzjoni li wasslet biex jitbaxxa l-livell ta’ ‘credit rating’ tal-Greċja, li minn A tniżżel għal A-. Sadanittant id-differenza fir-rati tal-imgħax fuq il-bonds kompliet tiżdied bejn il-bonds tal-Gvern Grieg u dawk Ġer¬maniżi kompliet tit¬wessa, minkejja l-fatt li l-Greċja diġà ħallset ferm aktar fuq il-bonds tagħha minn kull pajjiż ieħor tal-Unjoni Ewropea. Il-Ministru tal-Finanzi l-ġdid tal-Greċja, George Papa¬constantinou, wasal biex jikteb artiklu fil-Wall Street Journal fi sforz biex jassigura lill-investituri u lill-kummentaturi finanzjarji li waqt li l-pajjiż jinsab f’riċessjoni u qed jiffaċċja sitwazzjoni fiskali gravi, il-Greċja mhux se tfalli. Huwa veru li l-“problema Griega” mhix xi ħaġa ġdida. Il-Greċja għaddiet parti kbira minn dawn l-aħħar għaxar snin bi djun dejjem jikbru u b’defiċits fil-baġits għoljin mmens. Dwar dan id-defiċit il-Gvern Soċjalista attwali wiret mingħand il-Gvern Konservattiv “kotba mbagħbsin”. Id-defiċit għal din is-sena mistenni jkun jammonta għal 12.7% tal-Prodott Gross Domestiku, kuntrarjament għal 8% kif kien dikjarat mill-Gvern Konservattiv. Huwa pproġettat li sas-sena 2011 id-dejn tal-Gvern Grieg mistenni jkun tela’ għal 135%. Il-Greċja, bħall-Italja u ħafna pajjiżi oħrajn tal-Unjoni Ewro¬pea, kienu qegħdin iħarsu lejn iż-Żona Ewro bħala l-verżjoni moderna tal-Arka ta’ Noe li ssalvahom mid-diżastru finanzjarju. Bħal Malta, il-Greċja ħadet miżuri fil-qosor biex tassigura li tin¬għaqad mal-Ewro malajr, imma m’għamlitx ir-riformi strutturali fil-fond biex tassigura pro¬dut¬tività akbar kif ukoll is-sostenn tal-programmi tas-settur pubbliku. Madankollu, il-Gvern Soċjalista Grieg wera li fehem il-gravità tas-sitwazzjoni u hu lest li jaġixxi. Il-Prim Ministru Grieg, George Papandreou, ġimgħa biss wara li ngħata s-setgħa f’Ottubru li ghadda, ammetta li l-ekonomija ta’ pajjiżu kienet “fil-kura intensiva” u żied li l-Greċja kienet qed tiffaċċja “l-agħar kriżi ekonomika mir-ritorn għad-demokrazija”. Papandreou għandu l-vantaġġ li l-opinjoni pubblika hija konxja tad-diżastru li wiret il-Gvern tiegħu u dan għandu jagħtih l-appoġġ pubbliku għall-miżuri meħtieġa imma mhux popolari. Il-Prim Ministru Grieg ippropona abbozz ta’ baġit li filwaqt li jinkludi programm ta’ stimulu finanzjarju ta’ tliet biljun ewro; nefqa akbar fl-edukaz¬zjoni u s-saħħa, fl-istess ħin tnaqqis fin-nefqa f’oqsma oħra. Miżuri li jinkludu tnaqqis ta’ 25% fuq il-konsum tal-Gvern; iffriżar fuq l-impjiegi fis-servizz ċivili, b’mod li jkun impjegat wieħed għal kull ħames impjiegi li jispiċċaw bl-età tal-irtirar; kif ukoll tnaqqis fin-nefqa għad-difiża. Il-Gvern wiegħed ukoll riforma fil-pensjoni u miżuri biex tkun miġġielda l-evażjoni tat-taxxa. Il-Gvern Grieg qed jittama li b’riżultat ta’ dawn il-miżuri, sa tmiem is-sena 2010 id-deficit ikun tniżżel għal 9.1%. Tamiet sbieħ li għad iridu jkunu kumplimentati bir-riżultati. Ir-reazzjoni tas-swieq finanzjarji turi li huma ferm bogħod minn konvinti. Ħaġa waħda hija ċerta: il-Greċja, u min hu bħalha, ma jistgħux jistennew wisq favuri mill-Unjoni Ewropea. Il-Patt tal-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Istabilità u Tkabbir (SGP), li jistipula li l-pajjiżi membri għandhom iżommu l-livelli tad-djun taħt is-60% u d-defiċit tal-baġit taħt it-3%, ħa daqqa sewwa waqt il-kriżi. Fil-verità l-pajjiżi kollha tal-Unjoni Ewropea, inkluż Malta, kisru dak li jgħid l-SGP, bil-Kummissjoni u l-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew f’attentati ddisprati biex jassiguraw li r-regoli tagħhom li jinkoraġġixxu pru¬denza fiskali ma jkunux abbandunati totalment. Fil-laqgħa tal-Ministri tal-Finanzi Ewropej ta’ ftit jiem ilu, il-Greċja ppreparat lilha nnifis¬ha għal penalitajiet iebsin. Fi kliem ieħor, huwa possibbli li l-Greċja tintalab tagħmel baġit supplimentari li fih jintalab aktar tnaqqis. Jien xorta għadni nemmen li l-Greċja ssalva. Bħala mem¬bru taz-Żona Ewro mhux se tit¬ħalla ma ssalvax, bil-President tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew, Trichet, ikompli jwarrab mistoqsijiet tal-ġurnalisti dwar il-possibiltà li pajjiż fl-Ewro jispiċċa fallut. Iż-Żona Ewro hija għaqda po¬litika daqskemm hija għaqda ekonomika u finanzjarja. Ikun imbaraz¬zanti ferm għall-Unjoni Ewropea kieku kellu jiġri li pajjiż jaqa’ mill-Ewro. Allura wara kollox, wieħed jista’ jgħid li l-fatt li tkun mem¬bru tal-Ewro jiggarantixxi protezzjoni milli ċċedi taħt id-dejn nazzjonali? Mhux daqs¬tant b’mod mgħaġġel. It-tweġiba hija fl-affermattiv, imma mhux għar-raġunijiet implikati minn dawk li jsostnu l-verżjoni tal-Arka ta’ Noe. Filfatt is-salvazzjoni, jekk, u meta sseħħ, se sseħħ b’riżultat ta’ dixxiplina mis-suq, mir-’Rating Agencies’ u mill-IMF, minn pressjoni tal-Patt tal-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Istabilità u t-Tkabbir… kollha flimkien. Huwa permezz ta’ sagrifiċċji enormi u miżuri iebsin furzati fuq pajjiż membru taż-Żona Ewro li finalment iwasslu biex isalvaw pajjiż minn falliment. Definittivament l-Unjoni Ewropea mhux se sservi ta’ salvatur faċli. Minkejja kollox, l-istorja Griega għandha sservi ta’ twissija b’saħħitha lil pajjiżi membri oħrajn, fosthom Malta. It-tkabbir tad-djun u d-defiċits tal-baġit, tbagħbis tal-kotba u l-fehma li sħubija fl-Ewro se tipprovdi ċekk mif¬tuħ, eventwalment iwassluk għal saram kbir. Mingħajr finanzi pubbliċi kredibbli u dixxiplina fiskali u monetarja, ir-ritorn sostenibbli għal tkabbir ekonomiku u normalità m’huma xejn aktar minn ħolma sew jekk tkun membru taż-Żona Ewro kif ukoll jekk tkun barra.
When Brussels called our bluff
The Times - Tuesday, 17th November 2009
I suppose we should all be glad that our Minister of Finance has finally come to the conclusion that it is impossible for Malta to meet the 2010 deadline to correct its excessive deficit and to ask for the Commission to extend its deadline for Malta. It is, however, pertinent to ask why it has taken him so long to do just that. Back in July, one of my first actions as a new MEP was to table a parliamentary question to the European Commission asking why Malta had only been given a year to cut its deficit from 4.5 per cent to three per cent while other countries had been given deadlines of 2013 or even longer. Essentially, the Commission's reply ignored the recommendations made by the IMF proposing a 2013 deadline and added that "special circumstances" for Malta did not exist. In my maiden speech to the Parliament in Strasbourg in September, in advance of the G20 summit in the United States the following week, I returned to the theme. The EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Joaquin Almunia, told us twice (once in committee and then the following day in Parliament) that no EU country should stop economic stimulus packages until we can see a clear return to economic growth. Indeed, there is general agreement on this across the EU and in the US. But how could Malta cut its deficit by over 1.5 per cent without damaging our long-term economic and employment prospects? It was a completely contradictory position, and I said so. All along, the government and my two MEP colleagues from the EPP were giving the impression that the government intended to keep to its Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDF) deadline and my repeated imploring with EU officials was practically frowned upon. The reasons for this are not hard to tell. This Nationalist government's behaviour follows a familiar template. One: when the economy is in trouble keep a stiff upper lip and deny any problems. Two: give optimistic budgetary forecasts so that negative outcomes could be portrayed as unexpected surprises rather than entirely predictable outcomes. This negotiating strategy was so well played that, initially, the EU Commission believed the ruse that our excessive deficit was transient and not significant. I did point out at the time that I could not believe the Commission could be so naïve. It was not. Just a few weeks later the Commission called the government's bluff, seemingly taking at face value the government's inaccurate and misleading assertion that Malta's excessive deficit was just a one-off slip and would be swiftly corrected. For this reason, while confirming that the deficit was structural and not transient, it duly slapped an EDP on Malta and gave us the shortest compliance deadline of any other EU member state in a similar predicament. The government should never have allowed to paint itself into such a tight corner with so little room to manoeuvre. How else can one explain the 2010 Budget where the government not only shirked from taking bold economic measures, such as cutting VAT on tourism-related services, but instead is forced to introduce a spate of hidden taxes by reducing its budgetary allocations to rent seeking organisations and corporations that are now expected to collect their revenues from new tariffs and other charges. In short, the government is in a difficult economic position that has greatly reduced its capacity to introduce effectively vital economic stimulus measures. This spring, the Commission, in responding to the Stability Programme for 2009 by the government, stated that "the risks of Malta delivering on any of its risks are high". They were being generous. Thanks to a dose of cosmetic accounting and more one-off schemes, the government gives, as always, the impression that its deficit is under control. In reality it is very obvious that the government cannot deliver on its promises to reduce our national debt and budget deficit. Minister Fenech tells us that a contraction in Malta's economy means that the circumstances have changed from when the EU made its decision in May about Malta's excessive deficit. The truth is that nothing has changed except his own perception of reality, which has been staring him in the face all along. Prof. Scicluna is a Labour member of the European Parliament.
I suppose we should all be glad that our Minister of Finance has finally come to the conclusion that it is impossible for Malta to meet the 2010 deadline to correct its excessive deficit and to ask for the Commission to extend its deadline for Malta. It is, however, pertinent to ask why it has taken him so long to do just that. Back in July, one of my first actions as a new MEP was to table a parliamentary question to the European Commission asking why Malta had only been given a year to cut its deficit from 4.5 per cent to three per cent while other countries had been given deadlines of 2013 or even longer. Essentially, the Commission's reply ignored the recommendations made by the IMF proposing a 2013 deadline and added that "special circumstances" for Malta did not exist. In my maiden speech to the Parliament in Strasbourg in September, in advance of the G20 summit in the United States the following week, I returned to the theme. The EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Joaquin Almunia, told us twice (once in committee and then the following day in Parliament) that no EU country should stop economic stimulus packages until we can see a clear return to economic growth. Indeed, there is general agreement on this across the EU and in the US. But how could Malta cut its deficit by over 1.5 per cent without damaging our long-term economic and employment prospects? It was a completely contradictory position, and I said so. All along, the government and my two MEP colleagues from the EPP were giving the impression that the government intended to keep to its Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDF) deadline and my repeated imploring with EU officials was practically frowned upon. The reasons for this are not hard to tell. This Nationalist government's behaviour follows a familiar template. One: when the economy is in trouble keep a stiff upper lip and deny any problems. Two: give optimistic budgetary forecasts so that negative outcomes could be portrayed as unexpected surprises rather than entirely predictable outcomes. This negotiating strategy was so well played that, initially, the EU Commission believed the ruse that our excessive deficit was transient and not significant. I did point out at the time that I could not believe the Commission could be so naïve. It was not. Just a few weeks later the Commission called the government's bluff, seemingly taking at face value the government's inaccurate and misleading assertion that Malta's excessive deficit was just a one-off slip and would be swiftly corrected. For this reason, while confirming that the deficit was structural and not transient, it duly slapped an EDP on Malta and gave us the shortest compliance deadline of any other EU member state in a similar predicament. The government should never have allowed to paint itself into such a tight corner with so little room to manoeuvre. How else can one explain the 2010 Budget where the government not only shirked from taking bold economic measures, such as cutting VAT on tourism-related services, but instead is forced to introduce a spate of hidden taxes by reducing its budgetary allocations to rent seeking organisations and corporations that are now expected to collect their revenues from new tariffs and other charges. In short, the government is in a difficult economic position that has greatly reduced its capacity to introduce effectively vital economic stimulus measures. This spring, the Commission, in responding to the Stability Programme for 2009 by the government, stated that "the risks of Malta delivering on any of its risks are high". They were being generous. Thanks to a dose of cosmetic accounting and more one-off schemes, the government gives, as always, the impression that its deficit is under control. In reality it is very obvious that the government cannot deliver on its promises to reduce our national debt and budget deficit. Minister Fenech tells us that a contraction in Malta's economy means that the circumstances have changed from when the EU made its decision in May about Malta's excessive deficit. The truth is that nothing has changed except his own perception of reality, which has been staring him in the face all along. Prof. Scicluna is a Labour member of the European Parliament.
Meta l-UE qliet lill-Gvern f’żejtu
www.l-orizzont.com - L-Erbgħa 18 ta' Novembru 2009
NISSOPPONI li kollha għandna nkunu kuntenti li finalment il-Ministru tal-Finanzi wasal għall-konklużjoni li huwa impossibbli li Malta tirregola d-defiċit eċċessiv tagħha sas-sena 2010 u li jitlob lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea testendi t-terminu għal Malta biex tilħaq dan il-għan. Madan-kollu, huwa pertinenti li nistaqsu għaliex il-Ministru Fenech ħa daqstant żmien biex jagħmel proprju dan. Lura f’Lulju li għadda, fost l-ewwel ħidmiet tiegħi bħala Membru Parlamentari Ewropew, kienet interpellanza bil-miktub li biha staqsejt lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea għaliex Malta kienet ingħatat biss sena żmien biex tnaqqas id-defiċit tagħha minn 4.5% għal 3% meta pajjiżi oħrajn ingħataw żmien sas-sena 2013 u anke aktar. Essenzjalment it-tweġiba tal-Kummissjoni injorat ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet tal-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali (IMF) li ppropona żmien sas-sena 2013 u qalet li “ċirkostanzi speċjali” għal Malta ma jeżistux. Fl-ewwel diskors tiegħi lill-Parlament Ewropew fi Strasbourg f’Settembru li għadda bi preparazzjoni għas-summit tal-G20 fl-Istati Uniti l-ġimgħa ta’ wara, erġajt qajjimt il-każ tad-defiċit ta’ Malta. Joaquin Almunia, il-Kummissarju Ewropew għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji, qalilna dar-btejn (darba fil-kumitat u l-għada fil-Parlament) li ebda pajjiż membru tal-Unjoni Ewropea m’għandu jwaqqaf il-pakkett ta’ stimulu ekonomiku qabel ma nkunu nistgħu naraw ritorn ċar għal tkabbir ekonomiku. Hemm qbil ġenerali dwar dan kemm fl-Unjoni Ewropea kif ukoll fl-Istati Uniti. Imma Malta kif tista’ tnaqqas id-defiċit tagħ-ha b’aktar minn 1.5% bla ma tagħmel ħsara lill-prospetti fit-tul fl-oqsma ekonomiċi u tax-xogħol? Kienet pożizzjoni kontradittorja kompletament, u dan hu dak li kont għidt. Sadattant, il-Gvern u ż-żewġ Membri Parlamentari Ewropej Nazzjonalisti kienu qegħdin jagħtu l-impressjoni li l-Gvern kien intenzjonat li jżomm maż-żmien mogħti għal tnaqqis fid-defiċit (EDP - Excessive Deficit Procedures), u prattikament jirrabjaw għall-appelli tiegħi ma’ uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea. Ir-raġunijiet għal dan mhux diffiċli tasal għalihom. L-attitudni tal-Gvern Nazzjonalista ssegwi mudell familjari. L-ewwel: meta l-ekonomija tkun fl-inkwiet, iċħad li hemm problemi. It-tieni: agħti tbassir baġitarju ottimistiku biex ir-riżultati negattivi jitpinġew bħala sorpriżi mhux mistennijin flok riżultati kompletament prevedibbli. Inizjalment din l-istrateġija ta’ negozjar intlagħbet tajjeb ħafna, tant li l-Kummissjoni Ewropea emmnet l-istrataġemma li d-defiċit eċċessiv kien wieħed li jgħaddi malajr u mhux wieħed sinifikanti. Dak iż-żmien kont irrimarkajt li ma stajtx nemmen li l-Kummissjoni Ewropea kienet daqstant “fidila”. Ma kinitx. Ftit ġimgħat wara l-Kummissjoni qliet lill-Gvern Malti f’żejtu, billi tat l-impressjoni li qiegħda tieħu bħala vera d-dikjarazzjoni żbaljata u qarrieqa tal-Gvern li d-defiċit eċċessiv kien nuqqas ta’ darba li jista’ jkun malajr ikkoreġut. Għal din ir-raġuni, waqt li kkonfermat li d-defiċit kien wieħed strutturali u mhux li jgħaddi malajr, ħabbtet ma’ wiċċ Malta EDP u tatna l-iqsar terminu ta’ żmien biex id-defiċit jinġieb f’postu meta kkomparat ma’ kif imxiet ma’ pajjiżi oħrajn membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea li kienu fl-istess sitwazzjoni tagħna. Il-Gvern qatt ma messu poġġa lilu nnifsu f’rokna ristretta bħal din bi ftit spazju fejn jimmanuvra. Kif jista’ xi ħadd jispjega b’mod ieħor il-Baġit għas-sena 2010 fejn il-Gvern mhux biss żamm lura milli jieħu miżuri ekonomiċi sodi, bħal tnaqqis tal-VAT fuq servizzi relatati mat-turiżmu, imma minflok kien sforzat jintroduċi taxxi moħbijin billi jnaqqas allokazzjonijiet finanzjarji fil-Baġit lill-organizzazzjonijiet u korporazzjonijiet li issa huma mistennijin li jiġbru huma l-flus minn tariffi ġodda u ogħla, u ħlasijiet oħrajn. Fi ftit kliem, il-Gvern jinsab f’sitwazzjoni ekonomika diffiċli li naqqsitlu bil-kbir l-kapaċità tiegħu li jintroduċi miżuri effettivi u vitali biex jistimula l-ekonomija. Fir-rebbiegħa li għaddiet, il-Kummissjoni, meta kienet qie-għda twieġeb għall-Programm ta’ Stabilità mill-Gvern għas-sena 2009, qalet li “r-riskji li Malta twassal fuq xi wieħed mir-riskji li ħadet, huma għoljin”. Kienu ġenerużi magħna meta qalu hekk. Grazzi għal doża ta’ kontijiet kosmetiċi u aktar skemi ta’ darba, il-Gvern, bħal dejjem, jagħti l-impressjoni li d-defiċit huwa taħt kontroll. Fil-verità huwa ferm ovvju li l-Gvern Nazzjonalista ma jistax isarraf il-wegħdi tiegħu li jnaqqas id-dejn nazzjonali u kif ukoll d-defiċit tal-Baġit. Il-Ministru Fenech jgħidilna li tnaqqis fl-ekonomija Maltija jfisser li ċ-ċirkostanzi nbidlu minn meta f’Mejju li għadda l-Unjoni Ewropea ħadet id-deċiż-joni tagħha dwar id-defiċit eċ-ċessiv ta’ Malta. Il-verità hi li xejn ma nbidel ħlief il-mod tal-Ministru stess ta’ kif iħares lejn ir-realtà li ilha tħares fiss f’għajnejh it-triq kollha.
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