www.l-orizzont.com - It-Tnejn, 17 ta' Mejju, 2010
Kmieni l-ġimgħa l-oħra l-kumpanija Awstrijaka li tmexxi l-Ajruport Internazzjonali ta’ Malta (MIA) ħabbret li l-irmied tal-vulkan Iżlandiż fisser telf ta’ 35,000 passiġġier għall-MIA. Wieħed jista’ jimmaġina x’tilfu ajruporti internazzjonali oħrajn ferm u ferm akbar minn tagħna. U waqt li l-MIA kienet qed tħabbar dan, il-vulkan reġa’ żbroffa, b’diversi ajruporti jerġgħu jingħalqu bil-konsegwenza li reġgħu ġew ikkanċellati numru kbir ta’ titjiriet, fosthom anke minn u lejn Malta.
L-aħħar żbroff tal-vulkan Iżlandiż reġa’ qajjem l-irwiefen fi ħdan l-Unjoni Ewropea. L-ispazju tal-ajru hu qasam fejn kull pajjiż jimxi u jadotta legislazzjoni individwali, anke jekk deċiżjoni li jieħu pajjiż A tista’, u fil-fatt taffettwa, lill-pajjiż B.
L-istati membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea ilhom għal snin twal iżommu lura milli jikkonċedu parti mis-sovranità tal-ispazju tal-ajru tagħhom bil-għan li l-ispazju tal-ajru jkun integrat u jitmexxa minn regolatur wieħed. Fin-nuqqas ta’ dan, malli l-vulkan beda joħloq il-problemi li ħoloq, il-Kummissjoni Ewropea sabet ruħha pparalizzata meta ffaċċjata bid-diżordni li żviluppat. Ħafna huma tal-opinjoni li kieku l-ispazju tal-ajru kien taħt il-kontroll ta’ regolatur wieħed il-problema kienet tkun trattata b’mod aktar effiċjenti.
F’sitwazzjoni bħal dik maħluqa mill-vulkan Iżlandiż, l-inċertezzi jridu jissarfu f’riskji kwantitattivi. Xi ħaġa li tkun trid titħalla f’idejn l-esperti biex jiġbru u jipproċessaw informazzjoni xjentifika, bħalma hu r-riskju kkawżat mill-irmied, l-irjieħat, it-temperatura u l-vijabilità tal-magni tal-ajruplani. Id-deċiżjonijiet imbagħad jittieħdu abbażi ta’ dak li jaslu għalih, meqjusin ir-riskji tal-għeluq tal-ajruporti paragunati mar-riskji li taħdem normali.
U hawn tqum il-mistoqsija li qegħdin jagħmlu, u għamlu, bosta. Jekk tali proċess hu xjentifiku, għaliex iwassal għal konklużjonijiet differenti? Għaliex kien hemm kumpaniji tal-ajru li waslu għall-konklużjoni li ma kienx hemm periklu li jtiru waqt li oħrajn ma qablux? Għaliex kien hemm pajjiżi membri li fetħu l-ispazju tal-ajru tagħhom u oħrajn le? Kien l-element finanzjarju li wassal għal ċerti deċiżjonijiet? Għax għalkemm il-proċess hu wieħed xjentifiku, id-deċiżjoni finali tittieħed wara li tkun evalwata l-informazzjoni provduta.
Il-fatt li kull pajjiż membru qiegħed juża metodoloġija differenti għall-ġbir ta’ informazzjoni u evalwar tagħha, iwassal għal regolizazzjoni tal-biċċiet u mhux daqstant funzjonabbli.
Ċertament li mekkaniżmu regolatorju għall-Ewropa kollha fejn jirrigwarda spazju tal-ajru ma kienx se jfisser li ma jitħassrux titjiriet, imma seta’ jgħin biex sitwazzjoni inkonvenjenti għall-aħħar ma tinbidilx fi kriżi, u kriżi mhux żgħira.
Tali sitwazzjoni inkonvenjenti żviluppat fi kriżi għax l-għeluq u l-ftuħ tal-ispazju tal-ajru kienu prerogattiva sħiħa ta’ kull pajjiż membru.
Id-deċiżjonijiet jittieħdu fuq pariri ta’ esperti u regolaturi li ma kellhom ebda inċentiv jaraw il-bżonnijiet ta’ regolaturi nazzjonali oħrajn.
Mingħajr mandatt biex tiġbor lill-bordijiet regolatorji u l-ispazju tal-ajru taħt kappa waħda, l-awtoritajiet Ewropej, f’sitwazzjoni bħal dik ikkawżata mill-vulkan Iż landiz, setgħu biss jaġixxu ta’ intermedjarji.
Madankollu, kull deni ħudu b’ġid. Il-vulkan Iżlandiż u l-effetti tiegħu hu ttamat li jservu ta’ stimulu biex sa tmiem din is-sena tkun iddaħħlet fis-seħħ sistema integrata fost il-pajjiżi membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea li tassigura użu, u kontroll aktar effiċjenti tal-ispazju tal-ajru fl-interess ta’ kulħadd.
B’riżultat tal-falliment ta’ banek Iżlandiżi li fihom intilfu l-miljuni f’depożiti, l-aktar mill-Ingliżi, ir-rimarka ta’ dawk affettwati meta ġew iffaċċjati mill-iżbroff tal-vulkan Eyjafjallajokull kienet tgħid: “Please send us cash not ash.” It-titlu tal-artiklu tal-lum tnebbaħ minn din ir-rimarka.
Baqar mill-Estonja
Il-ġimgħa l-oħra għaddejt jumejn fl-Estonja b’konnessjoni mal-inkarigu li ngħatajt mill-Parlament Ewropew (PE) għal tħejjija ta’ rapport b’konnessjoni mat-talba ta’ dan il-pajjiż biex jissieħeb fiż-Żona Ewro. Apparti l-inkarigu uffiċjali, huwa ovvju li titkellem dwar pajjiżek.
Li ma kontx naf huwa li kien hemm żmien meta Malta impurtat 800 baqra mill-Estonja.
L-Estonja qatt ma kellha ordni daqs hekk kbira f’kolp wieħed. Min-naħa tagħha l-Estonja tistampa l-munita karta, kroon fl-istamperija ta’ De La Rue f’Malta.
Tul il-jumejn li għamilt fl-Estonja kelli diskussjonijiet maċ-Ċermen ta’ żewġ Kumitati tal-Parlament Estonjan, il-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet tal-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Kumitat tal-Finanzi. Laqgħat oħrajn kienu mad-Direttur Ġenerali tal-Istatistika u mad-Deputat Gvernatur u Kap tal-Kumitat għall-Politika Monetarja.
Indirizzajt ukoll konferenza dwar il-munita ewro u finalment kelli laqgħa mal-Ministru tal-Finanzi.
L-ghajnuna lill-Grecja fil-Qorti Germaniza
Il-Qorti Kostituzzjonali Ġermaniża l-ġimgħa l-oħra ċaħdet it-talba għal ħruġ ta’ mandatt temporanju biex il-Ġermanja tinżamm milli tgħin tipparteċipa f’pakkett ta’ għajnuna lill-Greċja biex tinħareġ mill-kriżi ekonomika li tinsab fiha.
Madankollu l-Qorti Kostituzzjonali Ġermaniża se tikkonsidra aktar tard jekk is-sehem Ġermaniż jiksirx trattati Ewropej. Il-każ tressaq quddiem il-Qorti minn grupp akkademiku fformat minn Ewroxettiċi.
Sehem il-Germanja huwa ta’ €22.4 biljun fuq tliet snin.
Janalizzaw il-pjan Spanjol
Il-Ministri tal-Ekonomija u tal-Finanzi tal-Unjoni Ewropea għada se jkunu qegħdin jiltaqgħu biex janalizzaw il-pjan tal-Gvern Spanjol għall-miżuri ta’ awsterità maħsub biex jilqa’ milli Spanja tgħaddi mill-esperjenza Griega.
Wara li dan il-pjan ikun analizzat għada, il-Kummissjoni Ewropea mistennija tagħmel ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet tagħha f’Ġunju li ġej.
17.5.10
Britain enters uncharted territory
The Times - Saturday, 15th May 2010
For those of us who stayed up until the small hours watching the results unfold, the British general election was enthralling and completely moved along uncharted territory. Several days on, in the cold light of day, this seems to be an election that nobody won.
Gordon Brown's resignation as Prime Minister demonstrates the personal rejection of both him and his government. The Conservatives won the popular vote and 306 seats but, privately, leader David Cameron and, equally importantly, their activists, expected a workable majority of between 15 and 30 seats. To be reduced to forming a new, coalition government by offering Liberal Democrats seats in a new Cabinet, and an offer on reforming the voting system, is a nightmare scenario and Mr Cameron's authority as party leader could be fatally weakened.
On the other side, many Labour supporters regard this result as the great escape. With 258 seats in a hung Parliament, Labour are in a strong position in opposition alongside the left-leaning Scottish and Welsh nationalists and Britain's first Green party MP Caroline Lucas. Still, with a vote share of 29 per cent, it is Labour's worst performance since the Thatcherite 1980s. There can be no escaping that fact.
For the Liberal Democrats, however, this is the one that got away. Their leader, Nick Clegg, was the star of the campaign, outperforming both Mr Cameron and Mr Brown in the three US-style TV debates. Still, when it came to the crunch, the Liberal vote collapsed to 23 per cent (winning 57 seats) and far from the 30 predicted gains.
For them, the coalition means they are stuck between a rock and a hard place. There are gaping divisions between the two parties. On the issue of Europe the Lib Dems are openly federalist while Mr Cameron, especially with regard to the euro, makes Margaret Thatcher look like a diehard Europhile! Lib Dem economics spokesman Vince Cable, now a Cabinet minister responsible for banking reform, has been vocally criticising Britain's financiers for years.
But if the Lib Dems were the ones to wreck the coalition, they would face the charge that, with Britain needing to take measures to cut its £160 billion deficit, they had shown themselves too childish to provide a stable government.
On the other hand, accepting a deal involving a few Cabinet positions with the Conservatives will leave thousands of Lib Dem activists feeling bitterly betrayed.
If such a coalition were not to survive, Labour could well be in a perfect position to ram home the message that voting Lib Dem let the Conservatives into Downing Street by the back door and that the Lib Dems (alongside the Conservatives) were responsible for swingeing and unpopular public spending cuts. Labour could be back in power sooner than expected.
It is also worth remembering that most Lib Dem supporters consider themselves to be much closer ideologically to Labour than to the Conservatives. An opinion poll taken on the eve of the election revealed that 43 per cent of Lib Dem voters described themselves as centre-left or left, compared to 29 per cent who described themselves as centrist and just nine per cent who described themselves as centre-right or right.
Tony Blair's former adviser, Alistair Campbell, has already revealed that Labour HQ has been flooded with calls from Lib Dem members seeking to defect to Labour.
The fact is that most Lib Dems are either centrist or left-leaning. As a result, this election should finally end the myth that Britain is a conservative country.
With 52 per cent voting for centrist or left-leaning parties, it clearly is not.
Meanwhile, Mr Brown's resignation as Labour leader plunges the party into a leadership contest. Expect one or even both of the Miliband brothers (David and Ed) to stand, while Ed Balls, widely seen as a divisive figure, John Cruddas and Andy Burnham could also be candidates. David Miliband starts the race as favourite. However, this contest will not be completed for several months.
So, British politics is in a state of flux. How many, if any, of the two remaining party leaders will survive this British tsunami and whether a new voting system will break the centuries-old two-party hold on British politics only the future can tell.
For those of us who stayed up until the small hours watching the results unfold, the British general election was enthralling and completely moved along uncharted territory. Several days on, in the cold light of day, this seems to be an election that nobody won.
Gordon Brown's resignation as Prime Minister demonstrates the personal rejection of both him and his government. The Conservatives won the popular vote and 306 seats but, privately, leader David Cameron and, equally importantly, their activists, expected a workable majority of between 15 and 30 seats. To be reduced to forming a new, coalition government by offering Liberal Democrats seats in a new Cabinet, and an offer on reforming the voting system, is a nightmare scenario and Mr Cameron's authority as party leader could be fatally weakened.
On the other side, many Labour supporters regard this result as the great escape. With 258 seats in a hung Parliament, Labour are in a strong position in opposition alongside the left-leaning Scottish and Welsh nationalists and Britain's first Green party MP Caroline Lucas. Still, with a vote share of 29 per cent, it is Labour's worst performance since the Thatcherite 1980s. There can be no escaping that fact.
For the Liberal Democrats, however, this is the one that got away. Their leader, Nick Clegg, was the star of the campaign, outperforming both Mr Cameron and Mr Brown in the three US-style TV debates. Still, when it came to the crunch, the Liberal vote collapsed to 23 per cent (winning 57 seats) and far from the 30 predicted gains.
For them, the coalition means they are stuck between a rock and a hard place. There are gaping divisions between the two parties. On the issue of Europe the Lib Dems are openly federalist while Mr Cameron, especially with regard to the euro, makes Margaret Thatcher look like a diehard Europhile! Lib Dem economics spokesman Vince Cable, now a Cabinet minister responsible for banking reform, has been vocally criticising Britain's financiers for years.
But if the Lib Dems were the ones to wreck the coalition, they would face the charge that, with Britain needing to take measures to cut its £160 billion deficit, they had shown themselves too childish to provide a stable government.
On the other hand, accepting a deal involving a few Cabinet positions with the Conservatives will leave thousands of Lib Dem activists feeling bitterly betrayed.
If such a coalition were not to survive, Labour could well be in a perfect position to ram home the message that voting Lib Dem let the Conservatives into Downing Street by the back door and that the Lib Dems (alongside the Conservatives) were responsible for swingeing and unpopular public spending cuts. Labour could be back in power sooner than expected.
It is also worth remembering that most Lib Dem supporters consider themselves to be much closer ideologically to Labour than to the Conservatives. An opinion poll taken on the eve of the election revealed that 43 per cent of Lib Dem voters described themselves as centre-left or left, compared to 29 per cent who described themselves as centrist and just nine per cent who described themselves as centre-right or right.
Tony Blair's former adviser, Alistair Campbell, has already revealed that Labour HQ has been flooded with calls from Lib Dem members seeking to defect to Labour.
The fact is that most Lib Dems are either centrist or left-leaning. As a result, this election should finally end the myth that Britain is a conservative country.
With 52 per cent voting for centrist or left-leaning parties, it clearly is not.
Meanwhile, Mr Brown's resignation as Labour leader plunges the party into a leadership contest. Expect one or even both of the Miliband brothers (David and Ed) to stand, while Ed Balls, widely seen as a divisive figure, John Cruddas and Andy Burnham could also be candidates. David Miliband starts the race as favourite. However, this contest will not be completed for several months.
So, British politics is in a state of flux. How many, if any, of the two remaining party leaders will survive this British tsunami and whether a new voting system will break the centuries-old two-party hold on British politics only the future can tell.
Volcanic ash: an act of God turns to man-made chaos
The Malta Independent - Monday, 10th May 2010
Now that some of the dust has partly settled, and most of the travellers caught in the chaotic effects of Ejjaffjallajokull are safe at home, it is essential for individual EU member states to engage in critical analysis over their response to the ash cloud crisis.
True, the eruption of Iceland’s volcano was truly an act of God. What followed afterwards in terms of financial and social costs was all man-made. The member states’ procrastination over legislation for an improved pan-European regulatory framework was purely the EU members’ state own making.
For years these same member states have shown reluctance to concede even a token degree of sovereignty in return for an integrated airspace managed by a single regulatory body. As a result, the European Commission was paralysed in the face of increasing disorder. A single regulator managing an integrated European airspace would have been able to mitigate risk in a more efficient manner.
The risk management aims to reduce uncertainty by translating it into quantifiable risks. It involves a complex regulatory system that requires the relegation of a degree of decision-making power from governments to experts.
These experts gather and process scientific information, for example: the risk posed by the ash; winds; temperature; viability of airplane engines, and subsequently process this information using sophisticated mathematical models. Decisions are based on the experts’ conclusion regarding the risk of closure versus the risk of operating as usual.
Of course this begs the question that has been on the minds of many. If the risk assessment process is scientific and standardised through quantification, how and why did it lead to different conclusions? Some airline companies argued that it was safe to fly, other disagreed. At the same time that member states across Europe erratically opened and closed their airspace.
Was it the red ink across their financial book which was triggering some airline’s decisions? No one party was right or wrong. Although risk management is a scientific process, the ultimate decision is a judgment call based on the evaluation of the information available.
The current patchwork of regulatory framework, with each member state using different methodologies for information gathering and evaluation, makes for a fragmented and dysfunctional style of regulation.
While it cannot be argued that a number of delays would not have occurred and some flights would not have been cancelled, a consolidated pan-European regulatory mechanism would have avoided the transformation of an inconvenient situation into a major crisis.
The inconvenient situation was exacerbated into a crisis because the closure and opening of airspace was the complete prerogative of the individual member states. But as in most interdependent networks, one airport’s decision affects many others. The decisions of member states were informed by the advice expressed by their respective national experts and regulators who had no incentive to heed the needs of other national regulators.
Without the regulatory mandate to merge national regulatory boards and sovereign airspace into one integrated framework, EU authorities were limited by their role as intermediaries.
Indeed, this saga serves as a stark reminder that it is in certain areas member states that still hold the strings of power in the European political arena – sometimes at the expense of the ordinary citizen.
At least, the aftermath of the volcano will see a fast-tracking of the pending SES II. The directive will come into effect by 2010 and EU citizens will benefit from an integrated air traffic management system that will ensure a safer and more efficient utilisation of airspace. Furthermore, the revised directive will cap the growth of emissions per flight and will save the taxpayer a potential €2 billion with the possibility for more savings in the long run.
Now that some of the dust has partly settled, and most of the travellers caught in the chaotic effects of Ejjaffjallajokull are safe at home, it is essential for individual EU member states to engage in critical analysis over their response to the ash cloud crisis.
True, the eruption of Iceland’s volcano was truly an act of God. What followed afterwards in terms of financial and social costs was all man-made. The member states’ procrastination over legislation for an improved pan-European regulatory framework was purely the EU members’ state own making.
For years these same member states have shown reluctance to concede even a token degree of sovereignty in return for an integrated airspace managed by a single regulatory body. As a result, the European Commission was paralysed in the face of increasing disorder. A single regulator managing an integrated European airspace would have been able to mitigate risk in a more efficient manner.
The risk management aims to reduce uncertainty by translating it into quantifiable risks. It involves a complex regulatory system that requires the relegation of a degree of decision-making power from governments to experts.
These experts gather and process scientific information, for example: the risk posed by the ash; winds; temperature; viability of airplane engines, and subsequently process this information using sophisticated mathematical models. Decisions are based on the experts’ conclusion regarding the risk of closure versus the risk of operating as usual.
Of course this begs the question that has been on the minds of many. If the risk assessment process is scientific and standardised through quantification, how and why did it lead to different conclusions? Some airline companies argued that it was safe to fly, other disagreed. At the same time that member states across Europe erratically opened and closed their airspace.
Was it the red ink across their financial book which was triggering some airline’s decisions? No one party was right or wrong. Although risk management is a scientific process, the ultimate decision is a judgment call based on the evaluation of the information available.
The current patchwork of regulatory framework, with each member state using different methodologies for information gathering and evaluation, makes for a fragmented and dysfunctional style of regulation.
While it cannot be argued that a number of delays would not have occurred and some flights would not have been cancelled, a consolidated pan-European regulatory mechanism would have avoided the transformation of an inconvenient situation into a major crisis.
The inconvenient situation was exacerbated into a crisis because the closure and opening of airspace was the complete prerogative of the individual member states. But as in most interdependent networks, one airport’s decision affects many others. The decisions of member states were informed by the advice expressed by their respective national experts and regulators who had no incentive to heed the needs of other national regulators.
Without the regulatory mandate to merge national regulatory boards and sovereign airspace into one integrated framework, EU authorities were limited by their role as intermediaries.
Indeed, this saga serves as a stark reminder that it is in certain areas member states that still hold the strings of power in the European political arena – sometimes at the expense of the ordinary citizen.
At least, the aftermath of the volcano will see a fast-tracking of the pending SES II. The directive will come into effect by 2010 and EU citizens will benefit from an integrated air traffic management system that will ensure a safer and more efficient utilisation of airspace. Furthermore, the revised directive will cap the growth of emissions per flight and will save the taxpayer a potential €2 billion with the possibility for more savings in the long run.
L-istorja Griega għadha tibda
www.l-orizzont.com - It-Tnejn, 10 ta' Mejju, 2010
BĦAL-LUM ġimgħa tħabbar li l-Unjoni Ewropea approvat pakkett ta’ għajnuna finanzjarja lill-Greċja biex tgħinha toħroġ bil-mod il-mod mill-kriżi ekonomika li tinsab fiha. Pakkett ta’ €110 biljun mifrux fuq tliet snin.
Dak li seħħ fit-toroq tal-Greċja mhux biss qabel bħal-lum ġimgħa, imma anke tul il-ġimgħa li għaddiet, juri li dan il-pakkett ma niżel tajjeb xejn mal-poplu Grieg. Anzi, il-poplu Grieg mhux qed jaċċetta l-parti l-oħra tal-pakkett, il-parti li trid tikkumplimenta l-parti finanzjarja “barranija”, il-parti li jrid jagħmel tajjeb għaliha hu b’sagrifiċċji kbar immens.
Huwa għalhekk li jien tal-fehma li “l-istorja Griega għadha tibda”. U għadha tibda mhux biss fil-konfront tal-Greċja, imma wkoll fil-konfront tal-Unjoni Ewropea nnifisha, partikolarment fejn jikkonċerna t-Trattat ta’ Lisbona. Sadanittant, kellu jittieħed daqstant żmien biex tfassal il-pakkett t’għajnuna?
Nittrattawhom punt punt. Il-pakkett ta’ €110 biljun se jissostanzjawh pajjiżi tal-Unjoni Ewropea, taż-Żona Ewro, u l-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali (IMF), b’tal-ewwel joħorġu €80 biljun u l-IMF €30 biljun.
Pakkett li qiegħed hemm għad-dispożizzjoni tal-Greċja. Dan bil-għan li jkunu kkalmati s-swieq finanzjarji. Mingħajru l-Greċja ma kinitx se ssib min isellifha u jekk issib, l-imgħax ikun għoli ħafna għax ir-riskju huwa għoli ħafna wkoll.
X’inhi n-naħa l-oħra tal-pakkett? Dak li qed jitlob il-pakkett min-naħa tal-Greċja huwa programm ta’ awsteri tà. Awsterità f’livell ta’ sagrifiċċji kbar mill-poplu Grieg li għadu qatt ma kien hemm bħalhom fl-Unjoni Ewropea. Il-poplu Grieg mhux imdorri jagħmel dawn il-forom ta’ sagrifiċċji. Sagrifiċċji li forsi jkunu aċċettati fi stat ta’ gwerra. Imma mhux fi żmien ta’ paċi u aktar u aktar, għax hekk qed jikkmanda ħaddiehor, l-UE u l-IMF.
Imma anke jekk il-poplu Grieg finalment ikollu jaċċetta u jkollu jagħmel is-sagrifiċċji, il-ġudizzju personali tiegħi hu li l-ekonomija Griega se taqa’ f’riċessjoni kbira.
Il-konsegwenza ta’ dan hija li allura mhux se tkun biżżejjed biex tgħin jinġabru t-taxxi biex jirnexxielha toħroġ minn din il-kriżi. Tali ġudizzju huwa rifless ukoll fil-mod li bih qegħdin jaġixxu s-swieq finanzjarji u r-‘rating agencies’. Ma tlumhomx. Aktar u aktar meta jkollhom xamma li flushom mhux se joħduhom lura.
It-tieni punt. Kellu jittieħed daqstant żmien biex l-istituzzjonijiet tal-Unjoni Ewropea, bħalma huma l-Kunsill tal-Ministri, il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew u l-Kummissjoni nnifisha, jaslu fi ftehim dwar kif u b’kemm għandha tkun mgħejjuna l-Greċja?
Wieħed għandu jżomm f’moħħu li l-aktar li se tikkontribwixxi għal dan il-pakkett t’għajnuna hija l-Ġermanja. Ma rridux ninsew lanqas li mat-twaqqif tal-ewro, l-pajjiżi taż-Żona Ewro kellhom jieqfu milli jkollhom il-munita tagħhom. Hekk għamlet il-Ġermanja. “Tilfet” il-Mark Ġermaniż, munita li kienet fost l-aktar b’saħħithom. Minn dakinhar deher ix-xettiċiżmu Ġermaniż dwar kemm kienu se jkunu fl-istess livelli wħud mill-pajjiżi li riedu jidħlu u daħlu, fiż-Żona Ewro. Il-Ġermaniżi kienu xettiċi għax diversi huma dawk il-pajjiżi Mediterranji li daħlu fiż-Żona Ewro u komplew bl-istess stil ta’ ħajja, fejn jonfqu aktar milli jdaħħlu. Meta dawn il-pajjiżi kienu għal rashom kienu jbenġlu s-sitwazzjoni billi jiżva lutaw il-munita tagħhom, joħolqu ftit inflazzjoni u jmexxu.
Il-Ġermaniżi kienu xettiċi kemm pajjiżi bħal dawn kienu se jkunu kapaċi jiddixxiplinaw lilhom infushom u jżommu l-inflazzjoni baxxa. Twaqqaf il-Patt ta’ Stabilità u Tkabbir li kien immirat li jagħmel dan permezz ta’ miri fir-rigward tad-dejn u tad-defiċits. Però nafu li dan kien dgħajjef fil-konfront ta’ min mar ’l hinn mill-miri.
Imma issa s-sitwazzjoni hi li hi. Membru tal-familja, taż-Żona Ewro, jinsab fl-inkwiet. X’tagħmel? Tħallih jegħreq? Tħalli l-“marda” tinfirex f’pajjiżi membri oħrajn, bħal Spanja, l-Portugall, l-Italja, l-Ingilterra, l-Irlanda? Le, imma lanqas kellu jfisser li qisu ma ġara xejn. Int tiddejjen u jien inħallas.
Kien għalhekk li l-Ġermanja, meqjus il-fatt li se tkun hi li toħroġ l-aktar għall-pakkett ta’ għajnuna, insistiet li jiddaħlu miżuri ta’ awsterità fil-Greċja. Għax jekk le, mhux biss jintilfu l-flus, imma tisfaxxa ż-Żona Ewro. Din hi l-akbar sfida li qatt rat iż-Żona Ewro sa mit-twaqqif tagħha.
It-tielet punt. It-Trattat ta’ Lisbona. Trattat li nafu kemm dam ma twieled. Trattat, li għax kien jaħseb li setgħet tinqala’ sitwazzjoni bħal din, ħaseb għal deterrent. Jispeċifika li huwa projbit li pajjiż membru tal-Unjoni Ewropea, jew l-Unjoni Ewropea, jgħinu pajjiż li jaqa’ fi kriżi. It-Trattat ta’ Lisbona ma riedx li jkun hemm xi forma ta’ garanzija awtomatika u li b’hekk toħloq periklu morali, dak li l-Inglizi jsejħulu ‘moral hazard’.
Imma issa l-ħaġa saret. Il-konsegwenza hija li t-Trattat ta’ Lisbona jrid jiġi revedut. Fil-fatt l-UE dal waqt issejjaħ Konferenza Intergovernattiva biex fost l-oħrajn tara kif ’il quddiem din il-kriżi tal-lum tiġi evitata u jekk meta tinqala’ jkun hemm istituzzjonijiet u proċeduri f’posthom biex tissolva ruħha mingħajr biża’ li tgħerreq magħha liż-Żona Ewro.
Dan se jwassal għal mod ġdid kif iż-Żona Ewro trid tmexxi lilha nnifisha. Hemm min se jipprova t-triq jew sqaq tal-federaliżmu. Min hu l-aktar pragmatiku jfittex toroq oħrajn.
Żgur però li “l-istorja Griega għadha tibda”.
Il-qgħad fl-UE
Sa Marzu li għadda ċ-ċifra tal-qgħad fil-pajjiżi tal-Unjoni Ewropea kienet tammonta għal aktar minn 23 miljun. F’termini perċentwali dan l-ammont jirrifletti 9.6%, l-istess perċentwali tax-xahar ta’ qabel.
Il-varjazzjoni bejn il-pajjiżi membri bl-inqas nies qiegħda u dawk bl-ogħla persentaġġi hija waħda sostanzjali.
Filwaqt li fl-Olanda u l-Awstrija r-rata tal-qgħad hija 4.1% u 4.9% rispettivament, dawk tal-Latvja u Spanja huma 23.3% u 19.1% rispettivament.
Ikomparat mal-istess żmien is-sena l-oħra, kienet il-Ġermanja biss li rat żidiet fin-numru ta’ nies jaħdmu, bil-Gvern joffri sussidji lill-kumpaniji biex titnaqqas il-ġimgħa tax-xogħol.
Il-qgħad fil-Ġermanja niżel minn 7.4% għal 7.3%. Fuq in-naħa l-oħra, il-Latvja rat żieda ta’ tmien punti perċentwali fir-rata tal-qgħad, minn 14.3% għal 22.3%.
Ir-rata tal-inflazzjoni f’April li għadda kienet ta’ 1.5% ikkomparat ma’ 1.4% ix-xahar ta’ qabel. Sadanittant il-Konfederazzjoni tat-Trejdunjins Ewropej (ETUC) hija nkwetata dwar dak li jikkonċerna l-impjiegi għaż-żgħażagħ.
L-ETUC qiegħda tinsisti li l-impjiegi għaż-żgħażagħ għandhom ikunu fin-naħa ta’ fuq tal-prijoritajiet f’kull pjan li jista’ jsir biex tkun irkuprata s-sitwazzjoni fil-pajjiżi tal-UE.
Sodisfazzjon ieħor
Bhal-lum ġimgħa semmejt l-artiklu tiegħi “Sodisfazzjon”. Semmejtu hekk għax kien hemm pass fid-direzzjoni t-tajba wara li l-Enemalta ddeċidiet li ma taqtax id-dawl ta’ wħud mill-familji vulnerabbli li ma jkunux jistgħu jħallsu l-kontijiet tad-dawl u tal-ilma.
Nhar il-Ġimgħa tal-ġimgħa l-oħra kelli “Sodisfazzjon” ieħor. Kont mistieden “niddibatti” ma’ studenti minn diversi skejjel Maltin f’dibattitu Parlamentari fil-Kamra tad-Deputati fl-okkażjoni ta’ Jum l-Ewropa. Fuq “in-naħa tiegħi” kien hemm ukoll Deputati kemm tal-Gvern kif ukoll tal-Oppożizzjoni. It-tema tad-dibattitu mal-istudenti kienet “Is-Sena 2010 – Is-sena Ewropea għall-ġlieda kontra l-faqar u l-esklużjoni soċjali”.
Nistqarr li l-argumenti li ppreżentaw is-sitt studenti parteċipanti kienu argumenti studjati u riċerkati sewwa. Argumenti li jnisslu fik fiduċja u sodisfazzjon għal kontributi bħal dawk li smajna.
Prosit!
BĦAL-LUM ġimgħa tħabbar li l-Unjoni Ewropea approvat pakkett ta’ għajnuna finanzjarja lill-Greċja biex tgħinha toħroġ bil-mod il-mod mill-kriżi ekonomika li tinsab fiha. Pakkett ta’ €110 biljun mifrux fuq tliet snin.
Dak li seħħ fit-toroq tal-Greċja mhux biss qabel bħal-lum ġimgħa, imma anke tul il-ġimgħa li għaddiet, juri li dan il-pakkett ma niżel tajjeb xejn mal-poplu Grieg. Anzi, il-poplu Grieg mhux qed jaċċetta l-parti l-oħra tal-pakkett, il-parti li trid tikkumplimenta l-parti finanzjarja “barranija”, il-parti li jrid jagħmel tajjeb għaliha hu b’sagrifiċċji kbar immens.
Huwa għalhekk li jien tal-fehma li “l-istorja Griega għadha tibda”. U għadha tibda mhux biss fil-konfront tal-Greċja, imma wkoll fil-konfront tal-Unjoni Ewropea nnifisha, partikolarment fejn jikkonċerna t-Trattat ta’ Lisbona. Sadanittant, kellu jittieħed daqstant żmien biex tfassal il-pakkett t’għajnuna?
Nittrattawhom punt punt. Il-pakkett ta’ €110 biljun se jissostanzjawh pajjiżi tal-Unjoni Ewropea, taż-Żona Ewro, u l-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali (IMF), b’tal-ewwel joħorġu €80 biljun u l-IMF €30 biljun.
Pakkett li qiegħed hemm għad-dispożizzjoni tal-Greċja. Dan bil-għan li jkunu kkalmati s-swieq finanzjarji. Mingħajru l-Greċja ma kinitx se ssib min isellifha u jekk issib, l-imgħax ikun għoli ħafna għax ir-riskju huwa għoli ħafna wkoll.
X’inhi n-naħa l-oħra tal-pakkett? Dak li qed jitlob il-pakkett min-naħa tal-Greċja huwa programm ta’ awsteri tà. Awsterità f’livell ta’ sagrifiċċji kbar mill-poplu Grieg li għadu qatt ma kien hemm bħalhom fl-Unjoni Ewropea. Il-poplu Grieg mhux imdorri jagħmel dawn il-forom ta’ sagrifiċċji. Sagrifiċċji li forsi jkunu aċċettati fi stat ta’ gwerra. Imma mhux fi żmien ta’ paċi u aktar u aktar, għax hekk qed jikkmanda ħaddiehor, l-UE u l-IMF.
Imma anke jekk il-poplu Grieg finalment ikollu jaċċetta u jkollu jagħmel is-sagrifiċċji, il-ġudizzju personali tiegħi hu li l-ekonomija Griega se taqa’ f’riċessjoni kbira.
Il-konsegwenza ta’ dan hija li allura mhux se tkun biżżejjed biex tgħin jinġabru t-taxxi biex jirnexxielha toħroġ minn din il-kriżi. Tali ġudizzju huwa rifless ukoll fil-mod li bih qegħdin jaġixxu s-swieq finanzjarji u r-‘rating agencies’. Ma tlumhomx. Aktar u aktar meta jkollhom xamma li flushom mhux se joħduhom lura.
It-tieni punt. Kellu jittieħed daqstant żmien biex l-istituzzjonijiet tal-Unjoni Ewropea, bħalma huma l-Kunsill tal-Ministri, il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew u l-Kummissjoni nnifisha, jaslu fi ftehim dwar kif u b’kemm għandha tkun mgħejjuna l-Greċja?
Wieħed għandu jżomm f’moħħu li l-aktar li se tikkontribwixxi għal dan il-pakkett t’għajnuna hija l-Ġermanja. Ma rridux ninsew lanqas li mat-twaqqif tal-ewro, l-pajjiżi taż-Żona Ewro kellhom jieqfu milli jkollhom il-munita tagħhom. Hekk għamlet il-Ġermanja. “Tilfet” il-Mark Ġermaniż, munita li kienet fost l-aktar b’saħħithom. Minn dakinhar deher ix-xettiċiżmu Ġermaniż dwar kemm kienu se jkunu fl-istess livelli wħud mill-pajjiżi li riedu jidħlu u daħlu, fiż-Żona Ewro. Il-Ġermaniżi kienu xettiċi għax diversi huma dawk il-pajjiżi Mediterranji li daħlu fiż-Żona Ewro u komplew bl-istess stil ta’ ħajja, fejn jonfqu aktar milli jdaħħlu. Meta dawn il-pajjiżi kienu għal rashom kienu jbenġlu s-sitwazzjoni billi jiżva lutaw il-munita tagħhom, joħolqu ftit inflazzjoni u jmexxu.
Il-Ġermaniżi kienu xettiċi kemm pajjiżi bħal dawn kienu se jkunu kapaċi jiddixxiplinaw lilhom infushom u jżommu l-inflazzjoni baxxa. Twaqqaf il-Patt ta’ Stabilità u Tkabbir li kien immirat li jagħmel dan permezz ta’ miri fir-rigward tad-dejn u tad-defiċits. Però nafu li dan kien dgħajjef fil-konfront ta’ min mar ’l hinn mill-miri.
Imma issa s-sitwazzjoni hi li hi. Membru tal-familja, taż-Żona Ewro, jinsab fl-inkwiet. X’tagħmel? Tħallih jegħreq? Tħalli l-“marda” tinfirex f’pajjiżi membri oħrajn, bħal Spanja, l-Portugall, l-Italja, l-Ingilterra, l-Irlanda? Le, imma lanqas kellu jfisser li qisu ma ġara xejn. Int tiddejjen u jien inħallas.
Kien għalhekk li l-Ġermanja, meqjus il-fatt li se tkun hi li toħroġ l-aktar għall-pakkett ta’ għajnuna, insistiet li jiddaħlu miżuri ta’ awsterità fil-Greċja. Għax jekk le, mhux biss jintilfu l-flus, imma tisfaxxa ż-Żona Ewro. Din hi l-akbar sfida li qatt rat iż-Żona Ewro sa mit-twaqqif tagħha.
It-tielet punt. It-Trattat ta’ Lisbona. Trattat li nafu kemm dam ma twieled. Trattat, li għax kien jaħseb li setgħet tinqala’ sitwazzjoni bħal din, ħaseb għal deterrent. Jispeċifika li huwa projbit li pajjiż membru tal-Unjoni Ewropea, jew l-Unjoni Ewropea, jgħinu pajjiż li jaqa’ fi kriżi. It-Trattat ta’ Lisbona ma riedx li jkun hemm xi forma ta’ garanzija awtomatika u li b’hekk toħloq periklu morali, dak li l-Inglizi jsejħulu ‘moral hazard’.
Imma issa l-ħaġa saret. Il-konsegwenza hija li t-Trattat ta’ Lisbona jrid jiġi revedut. Fil-fatt l-UE dal waqt issejjaħ Konferenza Intergovernattiva biex fost l-oħrajn tara kif ’il quddiem din il-kriżi tal-lum tiġi evitata u jekk meta tinqala’ jkun hemm istituzzjonijiet u proċeduri f’posthom biex tissolva ruħha mingħajr biża’ li tgħerreq magħha liż-Żona Ewro.
Dan se jwassal għal mod ġdid kif iż-Żona Ewro trid tmexxi lilha nnifisha. Hemm min se jipprova t-triq jew sqaq tal-federaliżmu. Min hu l-aktar pragmatiku jfittex toroq oħrajn.
Żgur però li “l-istorja Griega għadha tibda”.
Il-qgħad fl-UE
Sa Marzu li għadda ċ-ċifra tal-qgħad fil-pajjiżi tal-Unjoni Ewropea kienet tammonta għal aktar minn 23 miljun. F’termini perċentwali dan l-ammont jirrifletti 9.6%, l-istess perċentwali tax-xahar ta’ qabel.
Il-varjazzjoni bejn il-pajjiżi membri bl-inqas nies qiegħda u dawk bl-ogħla persentaġġi hija waħda sostanzjali.
Filwaqt li fl-Olanda u l-Awstrija r-rata tal-qgħad hija 4.1% u 4.9% rispettivament, dawk tal-Latvja u Spanja huma 23.3% u 19.1% rispettivament.
Ikomparat mal-istess żmien is-sena l-oħra, kienet il-Ġermanja biss li rat żidiet fin-numru ta’ nies jaħdmu, bil-Gvern joffri sussidji lill-kumpaniji biex titnaqqas il-ġimgħa tax-xogħol.
Il-qgħad fil-Ġermanja niżel minn 7.4% għal 7.3%. Fuq in-naħa l-oħra, il-Latvja rat żieda ta’ tmien punti perċentwali fir-rata tal-qgħad, minn 14.3% għal 22.3%.
Ir-rata tal-inflazzjoni f’April li għadda kienet ta’ 1.5% ikkomparat ma’ 1.4% ix-xahar ta’ qabel. Sadanittant il-Konfederazzjoni tat-Trejdunjins Ewropej (ETUC) hija nkwetata dwar dak li jikkonċerna l-impjiegi għaż-żgħażagħ.
L-ETUC qiegħda tinsisti li l-impjiegi għaż-żgħażagħ għandhom ikunu fin-naħa ta’ fuq tal-prijoritajiet f’kull pjan li jista’ jsir biex tkun irkuprata s-sitwazzjoni fil-pajjiżi tal-UE.
Sodisfazzjon ieħor
Bhal-lum ġimgħa semmejt l-artiklu tiegħi “Sodisfazzjon”. Semmejtu hekk għax kien hemm pass fid-direzzjoni t-tajba wara li l-Enemalta ddeċidiet li ma taqtax id-dawl ta’ wħud mill-familji vulnerabbli li ma jkunux jistgħu jħallsu l-kontijiet tad-dawl u tal-ilma.
Nhar il-Ġimgħa tal-ġimgħa l-oħra kelli “Sodisfazzjon” ieħor. Kont mistieden “niddibatti” ma’ studenti minn diversi skejjel Maltin f’dibattitu Parlamentari fil-Kamra tad-Deputati fl-okkażjoni ta’ Jum l-Ewropa. Fuq “in-naħa tiegħi” kien hemm ukoll Deputati kemm tal-Gvern kif ukoll tal-Oppożizzjoni. It-tema tad-dibattitu mal-istudenti kienet “Is-Sena 2010 – Is-sena Ewropea għall-ġlieda kontra l-faqar u l-esklużjoni soċjali”.
Nistqarr li l-argumenti li ppreżentaw is-sitt studenti parteċipanti kienu argumenti studjati u riċerkati sewwa. Argumenti li jnisslu fik fiduċja u sodisfazzjon għal kontributi bħal dawk li smajna.
Prosit!
Sodisfazzjon
www.l-orizzont.com - It-Tnejn, 3 ta' Mejju, 2010
RAPPORT imxandar fil-ġurnal KullĦadd tal-Ħadd, 25 ta’ April, 2010, intitolat “Mhumiex se jispiċċaw bid-dawl maqtugħ” kien għalija bħal żiffa ħelwa f’ġurnata sħuna tas-sajf Malti. Rapport li nissilli sodisfazzjon, anke jekk dan jista’ jkun akbar.
Sodisfazzjon għax jirrifletti ċaqliq, anke jekk żgħir, favur dawk il-familji vulnerabbli li kienu fil-periklu li jistgħu jispiċċaw mingħajr provvista tal-elettriku għax ma jkunux ħallsu kontijiet pendenti li għandhom mal-Korporazzjoni EneMalta.
Sodisfazzjon għax dawn il-familji huma parti minn dik il-kategorija tal-poplu li fuqha bbażajt Mistoqsija Parlamentari f’Marzu li għadda lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea għax jien tal-fehma li dak li kien qed isir fil-konfront ta’ din il-kategorija ta’ familji jmur kontra Direttiva specifika tal-Unjoni Ewropea, li tipprojbixxi eżattament dan.
Skont ma ħabbar il-ġurnal KullHadd dawk il-pensjonanti li għandhom minn 65 sena ’l fuq mhumiex se jispiċċaw bis-servizz tal-elettriku maqtugħ jekk jaqgħu lura fil-ħlas tal-kontijiet tad-dawl u l-ilma. Barra dan, minn issa ’l quddiem, is-servizz tal-elettriku mhuwiex se jinqata’ f’każ li l-arretrati tal-kontijiet tad-dawl u l-ilma ma jkunux jeċċedu s-somma ta’ €1,000.
Il-qtugħ tas-servizz tal-elettriku, speċjalment lil familji vulnerabbli, familji li jkunu jiddependu għall-għixien tagħhom primarjament mill-benefiċċji soċjali, hija miżura ħarxa u kundannabbli għall-aħħar.
U biex ikompli jitwaddab il-melħ fuq il-ferita, il-qtugħ tas-servizz tal-elettriku jġorr miegħu ħlas ta’ €70 u trid tħallas €70 oħra biex terġa’ tingħata s-servizz.
Tista’ timmaġina xi jfissru €140 għal familja li ma kellhiex dawn il-flus disponibbli għaliha biex taqta’ parti mill-kontijiet pendenti li għandha mal-Korporazzjoni Enemalta.
Matul l-ewwel għaxar xhur tas-sena li għaddiet, u allura qabel ma ddaħħlu t-tariffi l-ġodda tad-dawl u l-ilma, il-Korporazzjoni Enemalta qatgħet is-servizz tad-dawl lil 2,148 familja u lil 459 negozju għax waqgħu lura fil-ħlasijiet tal-kontijiet tagħhom.
Huwa fatt innegabbli li l-pensjonant qed iħoss ħafna dan il-piż. Qed jiżdied in-numru ta’ pensjonanti li qed jispiċċaw “bil-pitazz tad-dejn” u jħallsu ammont kull xahar. Qiegħdin joħduna lura għall-ħamsinijiet meta ħafna familji kien ikollhom “il-pitazz tad-dejn” ma’ tal-merċa.
Din is-sitwazzjoni hija konfermata b’mod uffiċjali. Skont statistika provduta fil-Parlament mill-Ministru tal-Finanzi Tonio Fenech matul is-sena li għaddiet kien hemm 382 pensjonant ta’ ’l fuq minn 61 sena li daħlu fi ftehim ma’ ARMS Ltd biex iħallsu kontijiet tad-dawl u l-ilma li għandhom pendenti. Ma’ dawn kien hemm 2,727 residenzi oħrajn li daħlu fi ftehim simili.
Iċ-ċifri għall-ewwel tliet xhur u nofs ta’ din is-sena ma tantx jawguraw li s-sitwazzjoni se titjieb. Anzi jindikaw li s-sitwazzjoni se teħżien, għax issa se jkunu qegħdin jitħaddmu t-tariffi l-ġodda, li huma ferm ogħla minn tas-sena l-oħra. Fil-fatt s’issa, f’inqas minn erba’ xhur, diġa’ kien hemm 395 pensjonant li daħlu fi ftehim bħal dan u kien hemm 1,774 residenzi oħrajn.
Huwa minnu li dejjem aħjar milli jispiċċaw mingħajr servizz elettriku. Imma jibqa’ l-fatt li kull erba’ ġimgħat, il-pensjonant irid iwarrab parti mill-pensjoni, parti li tista’ tkun sostanzjali biex ikun assigurat li f’daru jkollu bozza tixgħel, ‘fridge’ fejn iżomm ikel u ħalib, magna tal-ħasil u biex jara ftit televiżjoni.
Ċertament li dan mhux lussu anzi neċessita`.
RAPPORT imxandar fil-ġurnal KullĦadd tal-Ħadd, 25 ta’ April, 2010, intitolat “Mhumiex se jispiċċaw bid-dawl maqtugħ” kien għalija bħal żiffa ħelwa f’ġurnata sħuna tas-sajf Malti. Rapport li nissilli sodisfazzjon, anke jekk dan jista’ jkun akbar.
Sodisfazzjon għax jirrifletti ċaqliq, anke jekk żgħir, favur dawk il-familji vulnerabbli li kienu fil-periklu li jistgħu jispiċċaw mingħajr provvista tal-elettriku għax ma jkunux ħallsu kontijiet pendenti li għandhom mal-Korporazzjoni EneMalta.
Sodisfazzjon għax dawn il-familji huma parti minn dik il-kategorija tal-poplu li fuqha bbażajt Mistoqsija Parlamentari f’Marzu li għadda lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea għax jien tal-fehma li dak li kien qed isir fil-konfront ta’ din il-kategorija ta’ familji jmur kontra Direttiva specifika tal-Unjoni Ewropea, li tipprojbixxi eżattament dan.
Skont ma ħabbar il-ġurnal KullHadd dawk il-pensjonanti li għandhom minn 65 sena ’l fuq mhumiex se jispiċċaw bis-servizz tal-elettriku maqtugħ jekk jaqgħu lura fil-ħlas tal-kontijiet tad-dawl u l-ilma. Barra dan, minn issa ’l quddiem, is-servizz tal-elettriku mhuwiex se jinqata’ f’każ li l-arretrati tal-kontijiet tad-dawl u l-ilma ma jkunux jeċċedu s-somma ta’ €1,000.
Il-qtugħ tas-servizz tal-elettriku, speċjalment lil familji vulnerabbli, familji li jkunu jiddependu għall-għixien tagħhom primarjament mill-benefiċċji soċjali, hija miżura ħarxa u kundannabbli għall-aħħar.
U biex ikompli jitwaddab il-melħ fuq il-ferita, il-qtugħ tas-servizz tal-elettriku jġorr miegħu ħlas ta’ €70 u trid tħallas €70 oħra biex terġa’ tingħata s-servizz.
Tista’ timmaġina xi jfissru €140 għal familja li ma kellhiex dawn il-flus disponibbli għaliha biex taqta’ parti mill-kontijiet pendenti li għandha mal-Korporazzjoni Enemalta.
Matul l-ewwel għaxar xhur tas-sena li għaddiet, u allura qabel ma ddaħħlu t-tariffi l-ġodda tad-dawl u l-ilma, il-Korporazzjoni Enemalta qatgħet is-servizz tad-dawl lil 2,148 familja u lil 459 negozju għax waqgħu lura fil-ħlasijiet tal-kontijiet tagħhom.
Huwa fatt innegabbli li l-pensjonant qed iħoss ħafna dan il-piż. Qed jiżdied in-numru ta’ pensjonanti li qed jispiċċaw “bil-pitazz tad-dejn” u jħallsu ammont kull xahar. Qiegħdin joħduna lura għall-ħamsinijiet meta ħafna familji kien ikollhom “il-pitazz tad-dejn” ma’ tal-merċa.
Din is-sitwazzjoni hija konfermata b’mod uffiċjali. Skont statistika provduta fil-Parlament mill-Ministru tal-Finanzi Tonio Fenech matul is-sena li għaddiet kien hemm 382 pensjonant ta’ ’l fuq minn 61 sena li daħlu fi ftehim ma’ ARMS Ltd biex iħallsu kontijiet tad-dawl u l-ilma li għandhom pendenti. Ma’ dawn kien hemm 2,727 residenzi oħrajn li daħlu fi ftehim simili.
Iċ-ċifri għall-ewwel tliet xhur u nofs ta’ din is-sena ma tantx jawguraw li s-sitwazzjoni se titjieb. Anzi jindikaw li s-sitwazzjoni se teħżien, għax issa se jkunu qegħdin jitħaddmu t-tariffi l-ġodda, li huma ferm ogħla minn tas-sena l-oħra. Fil-fatt s’issa, f’inqas minn erba’ xhur, diġa’ kien hemm 395 pensjonant li daħlu fi ftehim bħal dan u kien hemm 1,774 residenzi oħrajn.
Huwa minnu li dejjem aħjar milli jispiċċaw mingħajr servizz elettriku. Imma jibqa’ l-fatt li kull erba’ ġimgħat, il-pensjonant irid iwarrab parti mill-pensjoni, parti li tista’ tkun sostanzjali biex ikun assigurat li f’daru jkollu bozza tixgħel, ‘fridge’ fejn iżomm ikel u ħalib, magna tal-ħasil u biex jara ftit televiżjoni.
Ċertament li dan mhux lussu anzi neċessita`.
Role of the opposition
The Times - Tuesday, 20th April 2010
I do not think it is a good sign of our maturity as a nation state that the chances of success at the polls are pinned on one side by the hopes of a significant project such as Mater Dei or the new parliament opening on the eve of the elections, nor on the other side by the hopes that the economy is brought to its knees close to bankruptcy where the suffering of the population is unbearable. It is true that both scenarios do move the core supporters into an emotional frenzy, such that the political parties manage to recruit eager helpers easily in the campaign and ready to man the barricades.
But a close observation of the new upcoming electorate finds that this is not what they want or wish for. They want a government that manages wisely, looks at the long-term benefit of the social and economic fabric of our country and succeeds fairly well for the benefit of our families including their children. On the other hand, they want an opposition which is observant, highly critical of public policy, able to debate intelligently and that shows civility and co-operation when issues of national concern demand unity. Most importantly, it should show enough knowledge on social, economic and environmental issues so it will be looked at as the natural alternative to steer the political helm when the elect-orate so desires.
It does not help the current debate about the role of government and opposition that various labels are being mischievously pinned on both party leaders from each opposing side.
With respect to Lawrence Gonzi as leader of the party in government, I do not think, as some of his critics might like to portray, that the PM is uncaring or that he is not ready to listen or is not approachable.
As a person in politics from the other side of this artificial divide, I would like to think that the government is doing all it can to get to grips with the economic situation, wants to get as much foreign investment as it can lay its hands on and would like Malta to excel.
Of course the opposition's gut feeling is that this government is failing miserably and that many a time there was a better way of going about it rather than the approach taken. It would be unnatural if an opposing party were not to have this feeling. Like any co-pilot, an opposition's fingers are raring to get a grip on the wheel. What is important is that it gives all the necessary assurances that it is not prepared to upset the balance of the plane in flight.
So what should the opposition wish for? I think it should wish that the economy really recovers. It should show that it understands the present situation well, why we are in it, and how we can get out of it. It is up to the government to come forward with the proposals, plans and draft solutions. It is the opposition's role to assess them, give a rigorous critical analysis of them and propose alternatives. The role of the opposition is to oppose, propose and, subject to results at the ballot box, depose. It should demonstrate its ability and knowledge just like a knowledgeable and experienced co-pilot sitting by the side of the captain who is ready to take over without hassles or tussles. The passengers could then put their mind at rest that both pilot and co-pilot know what they are doing, and that any hand-over will indeed be smooth.
The party in opposition must win the next election with conviction, not because the economy is in the worst possible state. As in a relay race, a sprinter should start running well before his team player passes the baton. At this point the opposition should, as in fact it is doing, continue to listen attentively to both experts and laymen alike and show a thorough knowledge of the policy issues. As the time gets nearer its plans must be more fully fleshed out.
Having come to know Joseph Muscat from close quarters, I am more than convinced he harbours no wish of putting any obstacles to the country's development, or that he lets himself fall into a continuous mood of negativity as to Malta's outlook, no matter how dark it might be at the moment. As for the claim that he lacks suggested solutions, my personal opinion is that he has often gone quite far in giving detailed recipes for a way forward. It is his obligation and duty, however, to constantly put forward reasoned criticism of government programmes and attack any misguided economic policy.
The electorate needs a new administration ready to hit the ground running - I think Dr.Muscat's team will be ready to do so.
I do not think it is a good sign of our maturity as a nation state that the chances of success at the polls are pinned on one side by the hopes of a significant project such as Mater Dei or the new parliament opening on the eve of the elections, nor on the other side by the hopes that the economy is brought to its knees close to bankruptcy where the suffering of the population is unbearable. It is true that both scenarios do move the core supporters into an emotional frenzy, such that the political parties manage to recruit eager helpers easily in the campaign and ready to man the barricades.
But a close observation of the new upcoming electorate finds that this is not what they want or wish for. They want a government that manages wisely, looks at the long-term benefit of the social and economic fabric of our country and succeeds fairly well for the benefit of our families including their children. On the other hand, they want an opposition which is observant, highly critical of public policy, able to debate intelligently and that shows civility and co-operation when issues of national concern demand unity. Most importantly, it should show enough knowledge on social, economic and environmental issues so it will be looked at as the natural alternative to steer the political helm when the elect-orate so desires.
It does not help the current debate about the role of government and opposition that various labels are being mischievously pinned on both party leaders from each opposing side.
With respect to Lawrence Gonzi as leader of the party in government, I do not think, as some of his critics might like to portray, that the PM is uncaring or that he is not ready to listen or is not approachable.
As a person in politics from the other side of this artificial divide, I would like to think that the government is doing all it can to get to grips with the economic situation, wants to get as much foreign investment as it can lay its hands on and would like Malta to excel.
Of course the opposition's gut feeling is that this government is failing miserably and that many a time there was a better way of going about it rather than the approach taken. It would be unnatural if an opposing party were not to have this feeling. Like any co-pilot, an opposition's fingers are raring to get a grip on the wheel. What is important is that it gives all the necessary assurances that it is not prepared to upset the balance of the plane in flight.
So what should the opposition wish for? I think it should wish that the economy really recovers. It should show that it understands the present situation well, why we are in it, and how we can get out of it. It is up to the government to come forward with the proposals, plans and draft solutions. It is the opposition's role to assess them, give a rigorous critical analysis of them and propose alternatives. The role of the opposition is to oppose, propose and, subject to results at the ballot box, depose. It should demonstrate its ability and knowledge just like a knowledgeable and experienced co-pilot sitting by the side of the captain who is ready to take over without hassles or tussles. The passengers could then put their mind at rest that both pilot and co-pilot know what they are doing, and that any hand-over will indeed be smooth.
The party in opposition must win the next election with conviction, not because the economy is in the worst possible state. As in a relay race, a sprinter should start running well before his team player passes the baton. At this point the opposition should, as in fact it is doing, continue to listen attentively to both experts and laymen alike and show a thorough knowledge of the policy issues. As the time gets nearer its plans must be more fully fleshed out.
Having come to know Joseph Muscat from close quarters, I am more than convinced he harbours no wish of putting any obstacles to the country's development, or that he lets himself fall into a continuous mood of negativity as to Malta's outlook, no matter how dark it might be at the moment. As for the claim that he lacks suggested solutions, my personal opinion is that he has often gone quite far in giving detailed recipes for a way forward. It is his obligation and duty, however, to constantly put forward reasoned criticism of government programmes and attack any misguided economic policy.
The electorate needs a new administration ready to hit the ground running - I think Dr.Muscat's team will be ready to do so.
It-tmiem jew il-bidu ta’ ugigħ ir-ras?
www.l-orizzont.com - Il-Ġimgħa, 16 ta' April, 2010
Bil-Greċja fi kriżi finanzjarja kbira li ggravat minn jum għall-ieħor u li magħha bdiet tiġbed liż-Żona Ewro kollha filwaqt li tħalli impatt fuq il-munita ewro nnifisha, is-“sejbien ta’ triq” għal għajnuna lill-Greċja tqis minn bosta bħala raġġ ta’ tama.
Anke jekk bħal kull kompromess politiku ieħor il-ftehim li waslu għalih is-16-il pajjiż membru taż-Żona Ewro huwa mimli twissijiet, imperfezzjonijiet u inċertezzi.
Fil-verità, il-ftehim milħuq x’ifisser eżatt għaż-Żona Ewro? Ifisser li l-uġigħ ta’ ras għaż-Żona Ewro għadda? Jew ifisser li dan l-uġigħ ta’ ras għadu kemm beda?
Potenzjalment il-ftehim milħuq jista’ jkun ifisser għajnuna ta’ 30 biljun ewro lill-Greċja bis-sehem tas-16-il pajjiż taż-Żona Ewro u tal-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali (IMF).
Filwaqt li n-naħa taż-Żona Ewro tikkordina bejnietha self ta’ 20 biljun ewro, allura żewġ terzi tal-pakkett, l-IMF tagħmel tajjeb għat-terz l-ieħor, 10 biljun ewro.
L-involviment tal-IMF fisser nuqqas ta’ qbil bejn l-aktar żewġ pajjiżi influwenti fiż-Żona Ewro, il-Ġermanja u Franza.
Franza, u mhux waħedha, dejjem emmnet u sostniet li ż-Żona Ewro għandha tħares lilha nnifisha mingħajr il-ħtieġa ta’ involviment estranju, bħalma hu l-IMF.
Mhux hekk taħseb il-Ġermanja. L-opinjoni pubblika fil-Ġermanja kienet ċara: m’għandhomx jintużaw fondi Ġermaniżi biex jgħinu lill-Greċja. L-involviment Ġer maniż f’dan il-pjan ta’ għajnuna lill-Greċja jista’ jkun ifisser li l-Kanċillier Angela Merkel ikollha tħallas prezz politiku talli marret kontra l-opinjoni pubblika.
Frankament ma naħsibx li dan il-ftehim ifisser li l-Greċja nħarġet mill-problema. Hemm differenza bejn li toħroġ lil xi ħadd minn problema u li tistabbilixxi għodda li permezz tagħha tipprovdi għajnuna finanzjarja temporanja.
Fil-verità l-partijiet kollha – il-President Van Rompuy; il-Prim Ministru Grieg George Papandreou; il-President Franċiż Nikolas Sarkozy u l-Kanċillier Ġermaniża Angela Merkel – kienu ddikjaraw li ma jixtiequx li din l-għodda tintuża.
Anzi. Jemmnu li l-fatt li jkun magħruf li hemm min hu lest jieqaf mal-Greċja għandu minnu nnifsu jservi biex tonqos l-ispiża fuq is-self mill-Greċja.
Fi kliem ieħor dan mhux ftehim li joħroġ lill-Greċja mill-problema, imma huwa forma ta’ garanzija lis-swieq finanzjarji li ż-Żona Ewro mhix se tabbanduna lil xi pajjiż membru tagħha.
Huwa wkoll sforz biex tkun stabbilizzata l-munita ewro, li f’dawn l-aħħar tliet xhur waqgħet b’madwar 7% meta pparagunata mad-Dollaru Amerikan.
Ħadd m’għandu jinsa li l-problema Griega mhix biss ir-riżultat ta’ kriżi fiskali, imma wkoll riżultat ta’ kriżi ta’ kompetittività. Id-defiċit fil-baġit tal-Greċja huwa ta’ 13% li miegħu hemm żieda ta’ 35% fl-ispiża ta’ produzzjoni jekk ipparagunat mal-Ġermanja u 60% jekk ipparagunat mal-Istati Uniti f’dawn l-aħħar għaxar snin. Biex il-finanzi Griegi jkunu sostenibbli jridu jkunu kkoreġuti dawn iż-żewġ punti.
Fil-verità l-Gvern Grieg irid ikompli bil-progress tiegħu li jikkorreġi d-defiċit. Irid jilħaq il-mira tiegħu li għal din is-sena d-defiċit ikun qatgħu bi 3% flimkien ma’ implimentazzjoni ta’ riformi biex itejjeb il-flessibiltà tas-swieq tax-xogħol u t-tiġ did.
Jekk il-Greċja mhux se tkun f’pożizzjoni li tikkonvinċi lis-swieq finanzjarji li qiegħda taġixxi b’serjetà, allura l-wegħdi ta’ self u garanziji miż-Żona Ewro u l-IMF mhux se jkunu jiswew il-karta li nkitbu fuqhom, bil-pożizzjoni tal-Greċja fiż-Żona Ewro tibqa’ waħda fraġġli.
Sadanittant il-premium fuq is-sogru jinqasam bejn il-pajjiżi membri taż-Żona Ew ro.
Madankollu jkun żbaljat jekk il-problemi taż-Żona Ewro jitpoġġew wara bieb il-Greċja. L-istat sfortunat li tinsab fih il-Greċja huwa sintomu ta’ mard akbar fl-ekonomija Ewropea fejn żbilanċi kbar fil-politika fiskali u l-kompetittività ħolqu żewġ klassijiet ta’ pajjiżi fiż-Żona Ewro.
Għandek il-grupp tal-pajjiżi dixxiplinati fejn tidħol politika fiskali, bħalma hija l-Ġermanja u l-pajjiżi Nordiċi u għandek il-grupp tal-pajjiżi, bħal Spanja, il-Portugall, l-Italja u l-Greċja fejn tali dixxiplina hija ferm laxka. Fil-jiem li għaddew dak li jissejjaħ ‘credit rating’ tal-Portugall tniżżel minn AA għal AA-, filwaqt li huwa vulnerabbli wkoll dak ta’ Spanja.
Din il-qasma wasslet biex fl-aħħar summit tal-Mexxejja tal-pajjiżi membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea, il-President Franċiż u l-Kanċillier Ġermaniża jitolbu għall-governanza ekonomika ġdida fl-Ewropa.
Dan id-dibattitu joħloq qasma politika oħra. Waqt li l-Ġermaniżi jħarsu lejn governanza ekonomika bħala mezz biex ikun hemm sorveljanza aħjar fuq l-ekonomiji ta’ pajjiżi bħalma hija l-Ġreċja, li ma kellhiex aġenzija tal-istatistika indipendenti, għall- President Frranċiż u oħrajn dan il-kunċett ifisser xi ħaġa aktar politika.
Skont id-diskussjonijiet li qed ikollna fil-Parlament Ewropew jidher li d-dettalji dwar kif irid jitħaddem il-pjan finanzjarju tal-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Greċja għad iridu jkunu maqbula, waqt li d-dibattitu dwar il-governanza ekonomika tal-Unjoni Ekonomika għadu kemm kemm beda.
Bil-Greċja fi kriżi finanzjarja kbira li ggravat minn jum għall-ieħor u li magħha bdiet tiġbed liż-Żona Ewro kollha filwaqt li tħalli impatt fuq il-munita ewro nnifisha, is-“sejbien ta’ triq” għal għajnuna lill-Greċja tqis minn bosta bħala raġġ ta’ tama.
Anke jekk bħal kull kompromess politiku ieħor il-ftehim li waslu għalih is-16-il pajjiż membru taż-Żona Ewro huwa mimli twissijiet, imperfezzjonijiet u inċertezzi.
Fil-verità, il-ftehim milħuq x’ifisser eżatt għaż-Żona Ewro? Ifisser li l-uġigħ ta’ ras għaż-Żona Ewro għadda? Jew ifisser li dan l-uġigħ ta’ ras għadu kemm beda?
Potenzjalment il-ftehim milħuq jista’ jkun ifisser għajnuna ta’ 30 biljun ewro lill-Greċja bis-sehem tas-16-il pajjiż taż-Żona Ewro u tal-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali (IMF).
Filwaqt li n-naħa taż-Żona Ewro tikkordina bejnietha self ta’ 20 biljun ewro, allura żewġ terzi tal-pakkett, l-IMF tagħmel tajjeb għat-terz l-ieħor, 10 biljun ewro.
L-involviment tal-IMF fisser nuqqas ta’ qbil bejn l-aktar żewġ pajjiżi influwenti fiż-Żona Ewro, il-Ġermanja u Franza.
Franza, u mhux waħedha, dejjem emmnet u sostniet li ż-Żona Ewro għandha tħares lilha nnifisha mingħajr il-ħtieġa ta’ involviment estranju, bħalma hu l-IMF.
Mhux hekk taħseb il-Ġermanja. L-opinjoni pubblika fil-Ġermanja kienet ċara: m’għandhomx jintużaw fondi Ġermaniżi biex jgħinu lill-Greċja. L-involviment Ġer maniż f’dan il-pjan ta’ għajnuna lill-Greċja jista’ jkun ifisser li l-Kanċillier Angela Merkel ikollha tħallas prezz politiku talli marret kontra l-opinjoni pubblika.
Frankament ma naħsibx li dan il-ftehim ifisser li l-Greċja nħarġet mill-problema. Hemm differenza bejn li toħroġ lil xi ħadd minn problema u li tistabbilixxi għodda li permezz tagħha tipprovdi għajnuna finanzjarja temporanja.
Fil-verità l-partijiet kollha – il-President Van Rompuy; il-Prim Ministru Grieg George Papandreou; il-President Franċiż Nikolas Sarkozy u l-Kanċillier Ġermaniża Angela Merkel – kienu ddikjaraw li ma jixtiequx li din l-għodda tintuża.
Anzi. Jemmnu li l-fatt li jkun magħruf li hemm min hu lest jieqaf mal-Greċja għandu minnu nnifsu jservi biex tonqos l-ispiża fuq is-self mill-Greċja.
Fi kliem ieħor dan mhux ftehim li joħroġ lill-Greċja mill-problema, imma huwa forma ta’ garanzija lis-swieq finanzjarji li ż-Żona Ewro mhix se tabbanduna lil xi pajjiż membru tagħha.
Huwa wkoll sforz biex tkun stabbilizzata l-munita ewro, li f’dawn l-aħħar tliet xhur waqgħet b’madwar 7% meta pparagunata mad-Dollaru Amerikan.
Ħadd m’għandu jinsa li l-problema Griega mhix biss ir-riżultat ta’ kriżi fiskali, imma wkoll riżultat ta’ kriżi ta’ kompetittività. Id-defiċit fil-baġit tal-Greċja huwa ta’ 13% li miegħu hemm żieda ta’ 35% fl-ispiża ta’ produzzjoni jekk ipparagunat mal-Ġermanja u 60% jekk ipparagunat mal-Istati Uniti f’dawn l-aħħar għaxar snin. Biex il-finanzi Griegi jkunu sostenibbli jridu jkunu kkoreġuti dawn iż-żewġ punti.
Fil-verità l-Gvern Grieg irid ikompli bil-progress tiegħu li jikkorreġi d-defiċit. Irid jilħaq il-mira tiegħu li għal din is-sena d-defiċit ikun qatgħu bi 3% flimkien ma’ implimentazzjoni ta’ riformi biex itejjeb il-flessibiltà tas-swieq tax-xogħol u t-tiġ did.
Jekk il-Greċja mhux se tkun f’pożizzjoni li tikkonvinċi lis-swieq finanzjarji li qiegħda taġixxi b’serjetà, allura l-wegħdi ta’ self u garanziji miż-Żona Ewro u l-IMF mhux se jkunu jiswew il-karta li nkitbu fuqhom, bil-pożizzjoni tal-Greċja fiż-Żona Ewro tibqa’ waħda fraġġli.
Sadanittant il-premium fuq is-sogru jinqasam bejn il-pajjiżi membri taż-Żona Ew ro.
Madankollu jkun żbaljat jekk il-problemi taż-Żona Ewro jitpoġġew wara bieb il-Greċja. L-istat sfortunat li tinsab fih il-Greċja huwa sintomu ta’ mard akbar fl-ekonomija Ewropea fejn żbilanċi kbar fil-politika fiskali u l-kompetittività ħolqu żewġ klassijiet ta’ pajjiżi fiż-Żona Ewro.
Għandek il-grupp tal-pajjiżi dixxiplinati fejn tidħol politika fiskali, bħalma hija l-Ġermanja u l-pajjiżi Nordiċi u għandek il-grupp tal-pajjiżi, bħal Spanja, il-Portugall, l-Italja u l-Greċja fejn tali dixxiplina hija ferm laxka. Fil-jiem li għaddew dak li jissejjaħ ‘credit rating’ tal-Portugall tniżżel minn AA għal AA-, filwaqt li huwa vulnerabbli wkoll dak ta’ Spanja.
Din il-qasma wasslet biex fl-aħħar summit tal-Mexxejja tal-pajjiżi membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea, il-President Franċiż u l-Kanċillier Ġermaniża jitolbu għall-governanza ekonomika ġdida fl-Ewropa.
Dan id-dibattitu joħloq qasma politika oħra. Waqt li l-Ġermaniżi jħarsu lejn governanza ekonomika bħala mezz biex ikun hemm sorveljanza aħjar fuq l-ekonomiji ta’ pajjiżi bħalma hija l-Ġreċja, li ma kellhiex aġenzija tal-istatistika indipendenti, għall- President Frranċiż u oħrajn dan il-kunċett ifisser xi ħaġa aktar politika.
Skont id-diskussjonijiet li qed ikollna fil-Parlament Ewropew jidher li d-dettalji dwar kif irid jitħaddem il-pjan finanzjarju tal-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Greċja għad iridu jkunu maqbula, waqt li d-dibattitu dwar il-governanza ekonomika tal-Unjoni Ekonomika għadu kemm kemm beda.
Greece: The eurozone headache
The Times - Thursday, 8th April 2010
After many weeks of confusion and political wrangling, the 16 eurozone countries have finally reached a deal on how to help debt-laden Greece. Like most political compromises, it is an agreement filled with caveats, imperfections and uncertainty.
The fine details of the deal remain unclear but the substance is a financing plan potentially worth €30 billion. It would consist of the 16 eurozone nations granting coordinated bilateral loans worth up to €20 billion, counting for two-thirds of the money, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) providing the rest.
The involvement of the IMF is widely being seen as a defeat for the French government and others who believe that the eurozone should be able to look after their own. However, it was one of the preconditions for the German government agreeing to the deal. Public opinion in Germany is strongly opposed to using German funds to assist Greece and Chancellor Angela Merkel may still pay a political price for agreeing to any deal that could involve German money.
I do not think this new agreement constitutes a bailout. It is one thing to implement a bailout and quite a different thing to establish an instrument to provide temporary financial assistance. Indeed, all sides - President Herman Van Rompuy, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Ms Merkel - have stated that they do not want this financial safety net to ever be used.
Instead, they believe that the existence of the plan should bring down Greece's borrowing costs. In other words, this agreement is not a bail-out but a guarantee to financial markets that the eurozone will not abandon one of its members. It is also an attempt to stabilise the euro, which has fallen by about seven per cent against the US dollar in the last three months.
While there has been a great deal of public confusion amid fevered talk of bailouts we should not forget that Greece's problems are not just the result of a fiscal crisis but also a competitiveness crisis. Its budget deficit is running at 13 per cent alongside unit labour costs that have risen by 35 per cent against Germany and 60 per cent against the US in the last 10 years. Both problems must be corrected if Greece's public finances are to become sustainable. Indeed, the Greek government must continue its programme to correct its budget deficit and meet its target to cut the deficit by three per cent this year, alongside reforms to improve the flexibility of its labour markets and innovation. If it cannot convince financial markets that it is serious, then loans and guarantees from the eurozone and the IMF will not be worth the paper they are written on. The position of Greece in the eurozone would remain fragile. In the meantime, the risk premium will now be shared with the eurozone countries where the spreads have already responded.
However, it would be wrong to blame Greece for the problems of the eurozone. Greece's plight is a symptom of a wider ailment in the European economy, where big imbalances in fiscal policy and competitiveness have led to a two-tier eurozone with disciplined members such as Germany and the Nordic countries in one group and the so-called PIGS in the other. Portugal's credit rating has been downgraded from AA to AA- and Spain is also vulnerable.
This divide led to demands at the EU summit, led by Mr Sarkozy and Ms Merkel, for a new "economic government" of Europe, with macro-economic policies more closely directed at EU level. This debate creates another set of political divides. While the Germans see economic governance as a means to introduce better monitoring of economies such as Greece, which had no independent statistical agency, the concept means something more political to the French President and others.
Certainly, it would be misguided to think that this EU summit agreement is the end of the difficulties facing Greece and the eurozone. The fine print of the EU "financing plan" will have to be agreed while the debate about the economic governance (or government) of the EU is one that has only just begun.
After many weeks of confusion and political wrangling, the 16 eurozone countries have finally reached a deal on how to help debt-laden Greece. Like most political compromises, it is an agreement filled with caveats, imperfections and uncertainty.
The fine details of the deal remain unclear but the substance is a financing plan potentially worth €30 billion. It would consist of the 16 eurozone nations granting coordinated bilateral loans worth up to €20 billion, counting for two-thirds of the money, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) providing the rest.
The involvement of the IMF is widely being seen as a defeat for the French government and others who believe that the eurozone should be able to look after their own. However, it was one of the preconditions for the German government agreeing to the deal. Public opinion in Germany is strongly opposed to using German funds to assist Greece and Chancellor Angela Merkel may still pay a political price for agreeing to any deal that could involve German money.
I do not think this new agreement constitutes a bailout. It is one thing to implement a bailout and quite a different thing to establish an instrument to provide temporary financial assistance. Indeed, all sides - President Herman Van Rompuy, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Ms Merkel - have stated that they do not want this financial safety net to ever be used.
Instead, they believe that the existence of the plan should bring down Greece's borrowing costs. In other words, this agreement is not a bail-out but a guarantee to financial markets that the eurozone will not abandon one of its members. It is also an attempt to stabilise the euro, which has fallen by about seven per cent against the US dollar in the last three months.
While there has been a great deal of public confusion amid fevered talk of bailouts we should not forget that Greece's problems are not just the result of a fiscal crisis but also a competitiveness crisis. Its budget deficit is running at 13 per cent alongside unit labour costs that have risen by 35 per cent against Germany and 60 per cent against the US in the last 10 years. Both problems must be corrected if Greece's public finances are to become sustainable. Indeed, the Greek government must continue its programme to correct its budget deficit and meet its target to cut the deficit by three per cent this year, alongside reforms to improve the flexibility of its labour markets and innovation. If it cannot convince financial markets that it is serious, then loans and guarantees from the eurozone and the IMF will not be worth the paper they are written on. The position of Greece in the eurozone would remain fragile. In the meantime, the risk premium will now be shared with the eurozone countries where the spreads have already responded.
However, it would be wrong to blame Greece for the problems of the eurozone. Greece's plight is a symptom of a wider ailment in the European economy, where big imbalances in fiscal policy and competitiveness have led to a two-tier eurozone with disciplined members such as Germany and the Nordic countries in one group and the so-called PIGS in the other. Portugal's credit rating has been downgraded from AA to AA- and Spain is also vulnerable.
This divide led to demands at the EU summit, led by Mr Sarkozy and Ms Merkel, for a new "economic government" of Europe, with macro-economic policies more closely directed at EU level. This debate creates another set of political divides. While the Germans see economic governance as a means to introduce better monitoring of economies such as Greece, which had no independent statistical agency, the concept means something more political to the French President and others.
Certainly, it would be misguided to think that this EU summit agreement is the end of the difficulties facing Greece and the eurozone. The fine print of the EU "financing plan" will have to be agreed while the debate about the economic governance (or government) of the EU is one that has only just begun.
Taxxa globali…għad narawha?
www.l-orizzont.com - L-Erbgħa, 7 ta' April, 2010
Diversi huma l-problemi kbar li qiegħda tħabbat wiċċha magħhom id-dinja. Hemm problemi li ilhom magħna, u huwa għajb li għadhom magħna, bħalma huwa l-faqar fost il-pajjiżi, u hemm problemi li tista’ ssejħilhom riċenti, bħalma huma dawk maħluqin mit-tibdil fil-klima. U hemm problemi li donnhom għandhom ċiklu, li jolqtuna kull tant żmien, bħalma hija l-kriżi finanzjarja, li din id-darba kienet waħda internazzjonali, u li l-effetti severi tagħha varjaw minn pajjiż għal ieħor, skont kemm il-pajjiż kellu riżorsi biex jilqagħlha.
“Pakkett problemi” li sab ruħu fl-iskaluni ta’ fuq nett tal-aġenda internazzjonali, preċiżament quddiem il-grupp magħruf bħala l-G20, li bħala grupp irid jara kif se jilqa’ għal dan kollu, b’mod partikolari biex jissalvagwardja l-ekonomija globali, u allura lill-pajjiżi kollha milquta. Fil-ġimgħat li għaddew bdejna naraw u niddiskutu f’livell ta’ Parlament Ewropew, proposti ta’ salvagwardja. Proposti li finalment bħal kull assiguraz zjoni jfissru finanzjament, u allura kif se jinġabru l-finanzi meħtieġa.
Proposta fuq dawn il-linji hija l-ħolqien ta’ taxxa fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji. Issa ilu numru ta’ ġimgħat sew li l-Parlament Ewropew, imlaqqa’ fi Strasbourg, iddibatta u adotta riżoluzzjoni li ressaq il-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji (ECON) li tat in-nifs lill-Unjoni Ewropea biex tiftiehem fuq pożizzjoni komuni dwar il-kwistjoni u tinnegozja mal-pajjiżi tal-G20 u mexxejja internazzjonali oħrajn, u biex il-Kummissjoni tħejji studju dwar l-impatt ta’ taxxa globali fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji, meqjusin il-vantaġġi u żvantaġġi potenzjali ta’ taxxa bħal din.
Kien il-kompitu tiegħi bħala Viċi-Ċermen tal-ECON li nressaq il-mozzjoni u mmexxi d-dibattitu Parlamentari dwarha. Fakkart kif 40 sena ilu, bħala student, parti mid-diskussjoni dwar l-Ordni Ekonomiku Internazzjonali Ġdid kienet dwar kif, dawk li kienu jissejħu SDRs (Special Drawing Rights), issirilhom xi forma ta’ taxxa fuqhom, imħallsa mill-gvernijiet, biex il-flus minnha jintużaw għall-programmi ta’ żvilupp f’pajjiżi fqar. Huwa fatt magħruf li dan il-ħsieb ma mmaterjalizzax.
Jista’ jkun li llum, b’riżultat tal-globalizzazzjoni, flimkien ma’ avvanzi teknoloġiċi u rieda politika akbar, ċerti pjani huma aktar fattibbli. Fl-istess ħin irid jingħad li żdiedet ukoll sewwa l-kompetittività fost l-għanijiet globali. Għalhekk wieħed irid joqgħod attent.
Hemm dik li tissejjaħ Tobin Tax, li taħseb għall-użu ta’ taxxa żgħira fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji, li d-dħul minnha jmur għal għajnuna ta’ żvilupp. F’Set tembru li għadda, fil-laqgħa tal-G20, kien hemm mexxejja politiċi li riedu li s-settur finanzjarju jħallas għal twaqqif ta’ fond ta’ stabilità u jipprovdi kumpens għall-ħsarat ikkawżati mill-kriżi finanzjarji lill-ekonomija dinjija.
Sadattant il-President tal-Unjoni Ewropea, Jose Manuel Barroso, issuġġerixxa l-introduzzjoni ta’ taxxa globali biex tiffinanzja proġetti ambjentali.
Dan kollu jeħodna lura għall-“pakkett problemi” li bdejt bih din il-kitba. Il-mistoq sija naturali hija: nistgħu verament nużaw taxxa waħda biex nilħqu dawn l-għanijiet differenti u f’daqqa?
Bħal kull munita oħra, din il-munita għandha żewġ uċuh. Hemm argumenti sodi favur taxxa fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji, u hemm riservi u mistoqsijiet daqstant ieħor sodi dwar kif jistgħu jinġabru l-fondi minn dawn it-taxxi; jekk l-ispiża tal-implimentazzjoni hux se tkun akbar mid-dħul innifsu; u min se jiddeċiedi kif jintużaw il-fondi miġburin.
Huwa eżattament għalhekk li r-riżoluzzjoni tal-ECON titlob għal studju dwar l-impatt minn tali taxxa proposta (li se jsir mill-IMF) biex ikunu jistgħu jitwieġbu numru sostanzjali ta’ mistoqsijiet.
Mistoqsijiet bħal kemm potenzjalment jista’ jkun id-dħul minn taxxa bħal din; x’effett ikollu fuq il-livell tal-prezzijiet; x’kienu l-esper jenzi minn taxxi simili preċedenti fejn jirrigwarda evitar ta’ ħlas ta’ taxxa u ċaqliq ta’ kapital jew servizzi; jekk taxxa tgħinx biex ikunu stabilizzati s-swieq finanzjarji; u, forsi l-aktar punt kruċjali, il-benefiċċji u l-iżvantaġġi li taxxa bħal din tkun stabbilita mill-Unjoni Ewropea waħed ha.
Fl-opinjoni tiegħi biex taxxa bħal din tkun effettiva jrid ikollha l-appoġġ tal-Istati Uniti u mexxejja oħrajn tal-G20 u mhux jekk titħaddem mill-Unjoni Ewropea waħedha.
Nemmen li f’livell ta’ Unjoni Ewropea għandna nevitaw li nadottaw xi ħaġa li tnaqqas il-kompetittività tagħna jew li xxekkel l-investiment, l-innovazzjoni u t-tkabbir ekonomiku. Ninsab imħasseb dwar il-fatt li finalment se jkun il-konsumatur li jkollu jagħmel tajjeb għall-ispiża tal-implimentazzjoni ta’ dak propost.
Jekk ma noqogħdux attenti, kull attentat biex nintaxxaw lill-banek jista’ jkun ifisser xejn iżjed minn taxxa oħra li trid titħallas mill-konsumatur.
Qabel naħsbu biex nikkonsidraw bis-serjetà l-implimentazzjoni ta’ taxxa fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji, għandu jkollna tweġibiet għal dawn il-mistoqsijiet kollha. Għandu wkoll ikun deċiż b’mod speċifiku x’se jkun l-għan li għalih jintużaw il-fondi miġburin.
Iffaċċjati minn ħafna għanijiet, għandna nenfasizzaw li kull għan għandu jkun trattat separatament u jagħmel użu minn strument wieħed għalih. Dan huwa prinċipju kardinali li nenfasizzaw fl-ekonomija.
Taxxa globali fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji tista’ tirnexxi biss jekk tkun iffokata, fattibbli, u jkollha appoġġ internazzjonali wiesgħa, u mhux jekk tittanta tkun l-affarijiet kollha f’daqqa għal kulħadd f’daqqa.
Diversi huma l-problemi kbar li qiegħda tħabbat wiċċha magħhom id-dinja. Hemm problemi li ilhom magħna, u huwa għajb li għadhom magħna, bħalma huwa l-faqar fost il-pajjiżi, u hemm problemi li tista’ ssejħilhom riċenti, bħalma huma dawk maħluqin mit-tibdil fil-klima. U hemm problemi li donnhom għandhom ċiklu, li jolqtuna kull tant żmien, bħalma hija l-kriżi finanzjarja, li din id-darba kienet waħda internazzjonali, u li l-effetti severi tagħha varjaw minn pajjiż għal ieħor, skont kemm il-pajjiż kellu riżorsi biex jilqagħlha.
“Pakkett problemi” li sab ruħu fl-iskaluni ta’ fuq nett tal-aġenda internazzjonali, preċiżament quddiem il-grupp magħruf bħala l-G20, li bħala grupp irid jara kif se jilqa’ għal dan kollu, b’mod partikolari biex jissalvagwardja l-ekonomija globali, u allura lill-pajjiżi kollha milquta. Fil-ġimgħat li għaddew bdejna naraw u niddiskutu f’livell ta’ Parlament Ewropew, proposti ta’ salvagwardja. Proposti li finalment bħal kull assiguraz zjoni jfissru finanzjament, u allura kif se jinġabru l-finanzi meħtieġa.
Proposta fuq dawn il-linji hija l-ħolqien ta’ taxxa fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji. Issa ilu numru ta’ ġimgħat sew li l-Parlament Ewropew, imlaqqa’ fi Strasbourg, iddibatta u adotta riżoluzzjoni li ressaq il-Kumitat għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji (ECON) li tat in-nifs lill-Unjoni Ewropea biex tiftiehem fuq pożizzjoni komuni dwar il-kwistjoni u tinnegozja mal-pajjiżi tal-G20 u mexxejja internazzjonali oħrajn, u biex il-Kummissjoni tħejji studju dwar l-impatt ta’ taxxa globali fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji, meqjusin il-vantaġġi u żvantaġġi potenzjali ta’ taxxa bħal din.
Kien il-kompitu tiegħi bħala Viċi-Ċermen tal-ECON li nressaq il-mozzjoni u mmexxi d-dibattitu Parlamentari dwarha. Fakkart kif 40 sena ilu, bħala student, parti mid-diskussjoni dwar l-Ordni Ekonomiku Internazzjonali Ġdid kienet dwar kif, dawk li kienu jissejħu SDRs (Special Drawing Rights), issirilhom xi forma ta’ taxxa fuqhom, imħallsa mill-gvernijiet, biex il-flus minnha jintużaw għall-programmi ta’ żvilupp f’pajjiżi fqar. Huwa fatt magħruf li dan il-ħsieb ma mmaterjalizzax.
Jista’ jkun li llum, b’riżultat tal-globalizzazzjoni, flimkien ma’ avvanzi teknoloġiċi u rieda politika akbar, ċerti pjani huma aktar fattibbli. Fl-istess ħin irid jingħad li żdiedet ukoll sewwa l-kompetittività fost l-għanijiet globali. Għalhekk wieħed irid joqgħod attent.
Hemm dik li tissejjaħ Tobin Tax, li taħseb għall-użu ta’ taxxa żgħira fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji, li d-dħul minnha jmur għal għajnuna ta’ żvilupp. F’Set tembru li għadda, fil-laqgħa tal-G20, kien hemm mexxejja politiċi li riedu li s-settur finanzjarju jħallas għal twaqqif ta’ fond ta’ stabilità u jipprovdi kumpens għall-ħsarat ikkawżati mill-kriżi finanzjarji lill-ekonomija dinjija.
Sadattant il-President tal-Unjoni Ewropea, Jose Manuel Barroso, issuġġerixxa l-introduzzjoni ta’ taxxa globali biex tiffinanzja proġetti ambjentali.
Dan kollu jeħodna lura għall-“pakkett problemi” li bdejt bih din il-kitba. Il-mistoq sija naturali hija: nistgħu verament nużaw taxxa waħda biex nilħqu dawn l-għanijiet differenti u f’daqqa?
Bħal kull munita oħra, din il-munita għandha żewġ uċuh. Hemm argumenti sodi favur taxxa fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji, u hemm riservi u mistoqsijiet daqstant ieħor sodi dwar kif jistgħu jinġabru l-fondi minn dawn it-taxxi; jekk l-ispiża tal-implimentazzjoni hux se tkun akbar mid-dħul innifsu; u min se jiddeċiedi kif jintużaw il-fondi miġburin.
Huwa eżattament għalhekk li r-riżoluzzjoni tal-ECON titlob għal studju dwar l-impatt minn tali taxxa proposta (li se jsir mill-IMF) biex ikunu jistgħu jitwieġbu numru sostanzjali ta’ mistoqsijiet.
Mistoqsijiet bħal kemm potenzjalment jista’ jkun id-dħul minn taxxa bħal din; x’effett ikollu fuq il-livell tal-prezzijiet; x’kienu l-esper jenzi minn taxxi simili preċedenti fejn jirrigwarda evitar ta’ ħlas ta’ taxxa u ċaqliq ta’ kapital jew servizzi; jekk taxxa tgħinx biex ikunu stabilizzati s-swieq finanzjarji; u, forsi l-aktar punt kruċjali, il-benefiċċji u l-iżvantaġġi li taxxa bħal din tkun stabbilita mill-Unjoni Ewropea waħed ha.
Fl-opinjoni tiegħi biex taxxa bħal din tkun effettiva jrid ikollha l-appoġġ tal-Istati Uniti u mexxejja oħrajn tal-G20 u mhux jekk titħaddem mill-Unjoni Ewropea waħedha.
Nemmen li f’livell ta’ Unjoni Ewropea għandna nevitaw li nadottaw xi ħaġa li tnaqqas il-kompetittività tagħna jew li xxekkel l-investiment, l-innovazzjoni u t-tkabbir ekonomiku. Ninsab imħasseb dwar il-fatt li finalment se jkun il-konsumatur li jkollu jagħmel tajjeb għall-ispiża tal-implimentazzjoni ta’ dak propost.
Jekk ma noqogħdux attenti, kull attentat biex nintaxxaw lill-banek jista’ jkun ifisser xejn iżjed minn taxxa oħra li trid titħallas mill-konsumatur.
Qabel naħsbu biex nikkonsidraw bis-serjetà l-implimentazzjoni ta’ taxxa fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji, għandu jkollna tweġibiet għal dawn il-mistoqsijiet kollha. Għandu wkoll ikun deċiż b’mod speċifiku x’se jkun l-għan li għalih jintużaw il-fondi miġburin.
Iffaċċjati minn ħafna għanijiet, għandna nenfasizzaw li kull għan għandu jkun trattat separatament u jagħmel użu minn strument wieħed għalih. Dan huwa prinċipju kardinali li nenfasizzaw fl-ekonomija.
Taxxa globali fuq transazzjonijiet finanzjarji tista’ tirnexxi biss jekk tkun iffokata, fattibbli, u jkollha appoġġ internazzjonali wiesgħa, u mhux jekk tittanta tkun l-affarijiet kollha f’daqqa għal kulħadd f’daqqa.
Can a global tax work?
The Times - Tuesday, 30th March 2010
An idea that has re-gained prominence as a result of the financial crisis is that of introducing a global tax on financial transactions. Several weeks ago in Strasbourg, the European Parliament debated and adopted a resolution tabled by the Economic and Monetary Affairs committee (Econ) giving the green light for the EU to agree a common position on the issue and negotiate with the G20 and other international leaders, and for the Commission to undertake an impact assessment of a global financial transaction tax looking at both its advantages and potential disadvantages.
Introducing the resolution and leading the parliamentary debate as vice-chairman of Econ, I spoke in plenary, noting that 40 years ago as a student, part of the New International Economic Order which we used to discuss, included a proposal to use special drawing rights (SDRs) loaned to the IMF to include a sort of tax on national governments which would be used for helping poor countries' development programmes. As we know, this did not materialise.
Many years later the effects of globalisation, combined with technological advancement and stronger political will, means that certain plans are now more doable. However, the number of competing global policy objectives has greatly increased. Alongside the original Tobin Tax idea of using a small financial transaction tax for development aid, some political leaders at the G20 summit last September called for the financial sector to pay for the establishment of stability funds and provide recompense for the damage caused by the financial crisis to the world economy. Meanwhile, President Jose Manuel Barroso has suggested the introduction of a global financial levy to fund environmental projects.
So, besides tackling poverty, we are now talking about using a financial transaction tax to combat the effects of climate change and to act as a sort of global insurance premium to compensate victims for the social and economic pain caused by financial crises. Can we really use one tax to achieve all these different aims?
Moreover, while there are many strong advocates of transaction taxes, there are also reservations and questions about how funds from it could be collected, whether revenues would be outweighed by the costs of implementing it, and over who would decide how the money was used.
That is why the Econ resolution called for an impact assessment on a transaction tax (being undertaken by the IMF) to provide answers to a range of questions such as: the revenue potential; how it would affect price levels; what the previous experiences of transaction taxes had shown in terms of tax avoidance or the migration of capital or services; whether a tax could help stabilise financial markets; and, crucially, the benefits and drawbacks of the EU going it alone in establishing a transaction tax.
From my point of view, it goes without saying that a transaction tax can only work effectively if it has support from the US and other world leaders in the G20, not by the EU going it alone. At EU level we should avoid any policy that would reduce our competitiveness or hamper investment, innovation and economic growth. I am also concerned that any extra costs borne by banks and other financial institutions in conducting financial transactions would simply be passed on to the end users.
If we are not careful, an attempt to apply a levy to banks could become yet another tax paid by consumers.
We need answers to all these questions before we can seriously entertain the implementation of a tax on financial transactions. We also need to decide on a specific purpose that the tax revenues would be used for. Faced with multiple policy objectives, we should stick to the wise rule that each objective needs its own separate instrument. A global financial transaction tax can only succeed if it is focused, achievable and commands widespread international support - not if it tries to be all things to all people.
An idea that has re-gained prominence as a result of the financial crisis is that of introducing a global tax on financial transactions. Several weeks ago in Strasbourg, the European Parliament debated and adopted a resolution tabled by the Economic and Monetary Affairs committee (Econ) giving the green light for the EU to agree a common position on the issue and negotiate with the G20 and other international leaders, and for the Commission to undertake an impact assessment of a global financial transaction tax looking at both its advantages and potential disadvantages.
Introducing the resolution and leading the parliamentary debate as vice-chairman of Econ, I spoke in plenary, noting that 40 years ago as a student, part of the New International Economic Order which we used to discuss, included a proposal to use special drawing rights (SDRs) loaned to the IMF to include a sort of tax on national governments which would be used for helping poor countries' development programmes. As we know, this did not materialise.
Many years later the effects of globalisation, combined with technological advancement and stronger political will, means that certain plans are now more doable. However, the number of competing global policy objectives has greatly increased. Alongside the original Tobin Tax idea of using a small financial transaction tax for development aid, some political leaders at the G20 summit last September called for the financial sector to pay for the establishment of stability funds and provide recompense for the damage caused by the financial crisis to the world economy. Meanwhile, President Jose Manuel Barroso has suggested the introduction of a global financial levy to fund environmental projects.
So, besides tackling poverty, we are now talking about using a financial transaction tax to combat the effects of climate change and to act as a sort of global insurance premium to compensate victims for the social and economic pain caused by financial crises. Can we really use one tax to achieve all these different aims?
Moreover, while there are many strong advocates of transaction taxes, there are also reservations and questions about how funds from it could be collected, whether revenues would be outweighed by the costs of implementing it, and over who would decide how the money was used.
That is why the Econ resolution called for an impact assessment on a transaction tax (being undertaken by the IMF) to provide answers to a range of questions such as: the revenue potential; how it would affect price levels; what the previous experiences of transaction taxes had shown in terms of tax avoidance or the migration of capital or services; whether a tax could help stabilise financial markets; and, crucially, the benefits and drawbacks of the EU going it alone in establishing a transaction tax.
From my point of view, it goes without saying that a transaction tax can only work effectively if it has support from the US and other world leaders in the G20, not by the EU going it alone. At EU level we should avoid any policy that would reduce our competitiveness or hamper investment, innovation and economic growth. I am also concerned that any extra costs borne by banks and other financial institutions in conducting financial transactions would simply be passed on to the end users.
If we are not careful, an attempt to apply a levy to banks could become yet another tax paid by consumers.
We need answers to all these questions before we can seriously entertain the implementation of a tax on financial transactions. We also need to decide on a specific purpose that the tax revenues would be used for. Faced with multiple policy objectives, we should stick to the wise rule that each objective needs its own separate instrument. A global financial transaction tax can only succeed if it is focused, achievable and commands widespread international support - not if it tries to be all things to all people.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)